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The apparent reduction in the magnitude of the Soviet threat must not
obscure the fact that challenges to the national interests of the United States still
remain. This thesis proposes that challenges to U.S. national interests have
changed to such a degree that American strategic planners must adopt a new
planning paradigm to replace the traditional one based on containment of the
Soviet Union. The thesis focuses on naval force and organizational planning over
the next ten to fifteen years, a timeframe during which the international
environment should undergo a transition to a multipolar balance of power system.
The thesis concludes that the Navy of the future can be smaller, but must
retain its technological superiority in all areas of warfare. A vigorous research and
development (R&D) effort remains essential, and production of new systems and
platforms must continue, albeit in smaller numbers and at higher unit costs.
Projection of power ashore will be the principal mission of conventional naval
forces. Organizationally, the Navy must expand its intelligence gathering efforts,
and must formalize career progressions for Strategic Planners, International
Negotiators and Legislative Affairs subspecialists.
The thesis includes a discussion of significant domestic constraints that
promise to jeopardize the attainment of the desired force structure.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The world is constantly changing in many diverse ways. Some changes and
trends are inherently more germane to defense planners than others since they
directly or indirectly determine the nature of the threats against which his
nation's military forces may be brought to bear in the future. These threats
heavily influence the planner's decisions concerning force structure.
This thesis proposes that challenges to U. S. national interests are changing
to such a degree that American strategic planners must adopt a new paradigm to
replace the post-World War II preoccupation with containment of the Soviet
Union. The new paradigm emphasizes healthy competition in pursuit of America's
vital national interests and is appropriate for dealing with all the challenges -
political, social, economic, military - confronting America. This analysis focuses
on naval strategic planning. Accordingly, it concentrates on the factors that will
have the greatest impact on future naval operations. Of these factors, military
threats are emphasized, but the effects of pertinent economic and political
developments are also considered since they combine with military developments
to form a milieu that constitutes a "New Threat" to naval forces.
The nature of the New Threat dictates that the United States will continue
to require armed forces to protect its vital national interests. Moreover, it
indicates that naval forces will remain the preferred branch of the armed forces for
crisis response. The thesis includes a series of recommendations for altering U.S.
Navy force structure and personnel organization to optimize the Navy's ability to
provide for U.S. national security and remain an effective tool of U.S. foreign
policy in light of the New Threat.
The thesis adopts a "grand strategic" perspective that seeks to consider those
dimensions of the international and domestic environment that influence naval
force planning. Accordingly, this is not an exhaustive treatment of all major
challenges confronting America as a whole, even though some of these - ecological
problems, increasing scarcity of important resources, world overpopulation - in all
likelihood will constitute the most formidable challenges to future American
security and world leadership (unless some shock to the international system
occurs such as the unexpected emergence of some new, aggressive great power).
Nonmilitary trends are only addressed if they affect the future use of naval forces
or promise to affect the Navy's ability to attain the desired force structure.
The analysis does not address each specific catalyst that may lead to a U.S.
military response. For example, international terrorism and the trade in illegal
drugs, two of today's most pressing threats, are not discussed individually because,
while they constitute two likely scenarios that might require a U.S. military
response, many other developments could lead to a requirement to employ U.S.
forces in a similar way. Therefore, rather than dwell on each potential catalyst for
a crisis, the analysis looks for similarities among them and develops a set of
qualities that future crises will most probably possess. These qualities will affect
naval force and organizational planning by indicating:
• where engagements will occur (U.S. equipment and personnel must be
groomed to perform well in that climate),
• why a U.S. military response to a crisis is necessary (indicating scope of the
operation, i.e., number of targets),
• what kind of foreign regime and political conditions will be involved
(indicating probable scope of expected resistance, which will affect ultimate
U.S. goals in using military force).
Within the setting of a future crisis, the thesis then addresses several
significant military developments on the part of potential adversaries. These will
directly affect how engagements are conducted and will therefore influence the
capabilities that U.S. naval forces must possess if they are to prevail in the New
Threat environment.
The Navy has commissioned a number of futures-studies projects, such as
The Implications of Advancing Technology for Naval Aviators and Navy 21, to
investigate what the future will demand of its forces. 1 Many of these have
emphasized the need to develop weapon systems or new weapons platforms to
counter emerging threats in specific environments, i.e. space, anti-air warfare,
mine countermeasures. This analysis cannot compete with these studies in depth
and quantitative analysis, and it is not its intention to do so. This study takes a
broad look at the probable scenarios in which the Navy will operate and fight over
the next 10 to 15 years, which is an essential first step toward deciding which areas
of naval warfare require the most emphasis in the near term.
The 10 to 15 year planning horizon of this study is significant. This
timeframe can be viewed as a transitional period during which an international
system dominated by East-West rivalry is replaced by a multipolar balance of
power system in which new great powers such as Japan, a United Europe, China,
JEarl I) Cooper and Steven M. Shaker, "The Military Forecasters," The Futurist (May/June
1988): 41-43.
India or even Brazil compete with the "old" great powers in various ways. At
present, considerable uncertainty exists regarding the relative positions of these
various candidates for great power status twenty years hence:
• America is frequently criticized for an inadequate educational system and an
ossified industrial base,
• Many are skeptical regarding Western Europe's ability to consummate a true
economic union in the advertised timeframe, especially when the recent
events in Eastern Europe are included in the equation,
• Unchecked high birth rates in India and China indicate that policy makers in
those nations will need to plow back any future growth in GNP into feeding
their people rather than expanding their ability to influence world events.
• The Soviet Union's economic difficulties have reached extremely serious
proportions.
Fortunately, until the major issues affecting international power distribution
become resolved, conditions affecting naval force planning during the transitional
period should develop according to certain trends regardless of which form the
future ultimately assumes. An appropriate response to emerging trends now will
greatly facilitate future expansion of naval forces if required once the character of
the new balance of power system becomes better defined
A 10 to 15 year timeframe is also useful because it forces the planner to make
recommendations starting with existing force structure and organization. For
example, a proposal that the Navy shift to a fleet composed entirely of submersible
vessels, an idea that may have considerable merit, would take years to realize and
is of little value in the near to mid-term. Accordingly, recommendations in this
paper are heavily oriented toward changing the form of the Navy by evolution
rather than "revolution".
Those interests that American policy makers deem as "vital" are a function of
the role they perceive for the United States in the world community. The
recommendations of this paper are predicated on the assumption that the United
State desires to retain its position of world leadership as the only truly super
power. Such a position would make it the "fulcrum actor" in the evolving
multipolar balance of power system. 2
This paper employs a traditional strategic planning approach to arrive at its
recommendations. Chapter Two describes the salient characteristics of the
changing nature of the threat as it pertains to naval force planning. Having been
the driving force behind naval force planning since World War II, the status of the
Soviet threat is addressed first. An examination of the likely effects of changes in
this threat upon U.S. alliance structures follows. Next, four militarily significant
aspects of the "New Threat" are discussed in depth: ballistic missile proliferation,
sea launched cruise missile proliferation, proliferation of nuclear and chemical
weapons, and proliferation of advanced conventional munitions or "smart
weapons" to Third World nations.
Chapter Three describes the post-World War II Containment Paradigm that
has pervaded American strategic thought for the past forty-odd years. It explains
the underlying assumptions that justified its adoption and success in protecting
U.S. national interests, and goes on to explain how the threat has changed
sufficiently for retention of the containment paradigm for planning and employing
2"Fulcrum actor" refers to that great power whose policies decisively shift the alliance
structure in u balance of power system. It can therefore influence the behavior of all other great
powers in the system. The use of this term is based on a reading of:
Morton Kaplan, The System and Process of International Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1958).
conventional U.S. armed forces to become dysfunctional. The chapter concludes by
proposing a new paradigm based on protection of America's vital national
interests. It recognizes that containment of the Soviet Union alone is not sufficient
to protect these interests and that, in many ways, the Soviet Union will be self-
contained for many years to come as long as the United States maintains sufficient
armed forces (including a strategic nuclear deterrent force) to prevent tempting
the Soviets into aggressive action. American armed forces must be designed to
counter the most likely threats to U.S. security rather than the Soviet threat.
Chapter Four compares the naval force structures that result from
application of old and new paradigms. It makes recommendations for a re-ordering
of the Navy's different roles, and translates these recommendations into
alterations in the size and composition of the fleet and the shore establishment.
This analysis indicates that radical changes are not required in the near term.
Changes are necessary, but existing forces can be modified slowly and deliberately
without the need for high funding levels that would doom plans involving more
radical change to failure. This finding makes implementation of the new
paradigm all the more workable.
After the threat has been analyzed and a revised naval force structure
recommended, Chapter Five explores the domestic political, economic and social
constraints that stand to influence the attainment of the desired force and
organizational structure. The chapter concludes that strong pressures exist to
reduce defense spending over the next several years regardless of the probability of
crises that might require the use of military force. Sound strategic planning is
absolutely essential if defense planners and their leaders are to have any hope of
gaining the funding they desire. Their plans must define the threats and show the
type and amount of U.S. forces required to counteract them; then they must "sell"
their views to the Congress and the American people.
Chapter Six summarizes the various conclusions and recommendations laid
out in the preceding chapters. It additionally lists some areas in which further
research would be of value in validating conclusions reached by use of the new
paradigm.
Briefly, the new paradigm indicates that the Navy of the future can be
smaller, but must remain at the leading edge of technology in all areas of warfare.
The need to maintain a strategic deterrent will remain. Projection of power ashore
will be the principal mission of conventional naval forces, which indicates that
amphibious and auxiliary ships will need to form a higher percentage of the fleet
than is presently the case. Additionally, requirements to maintain the capabilities
of the U.S. Marine Corps and expand the Navy's Special Warfare Forces will
persist.
In order to remain at the forefront of technology, the Navy must continue a
substantial research and development (R&D) effort. New classes of ships,
submarines and aircraft must continue to be fielded, albeit in smaller numbers, so
as to ensure that new systems receive adequate operational testing. R&D into
"exotic" technologies such as nonacoustic anti-submarine warfare and directed
energy weapons must also be continued.
The Navy's personnel organization must be altered to augment certain staff
specialties. The intelligence community must concentrate additional assets on
monitoring new threat centers. Good strategic planners must be given
appropriately rewarding career paths, and personnel trained in Area Studies,
International Organizations and Negotiations and Legislative Affairs should be
utilized in a more methodical manner.
II. THE CHANGING NATURE OF THE THREAT
A. INTRODUCTION
The alternative futures described in the last chapter indicate that the world
has the potential to evolve within a wide range of political, economic and social
possibilities over the next twenty years. Moreover, regardless of which future (or
combination of futures) predominates, rapid change will be the order of the day. At
one extreme, international cooperation will flourish, the use of military force by
the great powers will diminish, and huge strides will be made toward ending world
hunger and improving the environment. At the other end of the spectrum,
international relations will be chaotic and nations will be preoccupied with
preserving their very existence. In this world, the utility of and need for military
power will be very great.
Regardless of which form the future assumes, military strategists and
planners must develop forces that can win in battle if called upon to do so. In the
case of a global power like the United States, armed forces must be capable of
protecting vital national interests whenever and wherever hostile forces threaten
them. The ability to meet this goal depends on accurate threat analysis. Ideally,
threat analysis focuses on the military capabilities of potential opponents because
the intentions of a potential adversary can change much faster than his military
capabilities. However, various factors inevitably exist (e.g., fiscal constraints)
that limit the size and sophistication of a nation's military forces; strategic
planners accordingly must attempt to forecast the intentions of would be
adversaries regarding the likely use of their military capabilities, and incorporate
these intentions into their force structure recommendations.
This chapter describes a number of trends that can serve as guideposts for
U.S. military planners as the future unfolds. These trends affect the worldwide
military balance and have a high probability of proceeding regardless of which
alternative future predominates. While some shock to the system -- a severe
worldwide depression or the invention of some radical, new weapon of mass
destruction by a potential adversary -- could certainly occur and would radically
alter the strategic planning picture, the inability to foresee such events makes
reliance on prevailing trends the most sensible way to guarantee armed forces
capable of protecting America's vital national interests.
Therefore, as the world progresses toward a multipolar balance of power
system, certain key developments will be of particular importance when designing
the navy of 2010. The effect of these variables is most apparent when viewed
within the context of the three major groups of international relationships in
which the United States is involved:
• U.S. - Soviet, or East-West, relations,
• U.S. relations with its allies,
• U.S. relations with the Third World, or North-South relations.
B. U.S. - SOVIET RELATIONS
The U.S.S.R. will remain the leading threat to the security of the United
States by virtue of its strategic nuclear capability. The Soviet Union presently
10
commands the world's largest military forces. 3 Both the US and USSR maintain
sufficient strategic nuclear forces to assure that both sides will be destroyed if
either party attacks the other. However, the economic and political problems that
currently afflict the Soviet Union have softened the expansionist character of its
foreign policy and promise to continue to do so even if Mikhail Gorbachev is
overthrown by more traditional elements of the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union (CPSU) or by radical Russian nationalists. The Soviet forbearance during
the recent events in Eastern Europe has highlighted the severity of these
problems, and the degree of civil unrest in the Soviet Union itself indicate that the
Soviets will be preoccupied with economic and political restructuring for at least
the next ten years. During this time, the Soviet Union not only will refrain from
expansionism, but can also be expected to adopt a non-intrusive approach to
foreign affairs.
Domestically, the continuing slowdown in the Soviet economy has brought it
to a virtual halt. 4 Agricultural output remains insufficient to feed the Soviet
people. 5 An enduring nationalities problem exists, which "Russification" programs
have aggravated rather than diminished. The recent independence movements in
Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Georgia and Armenia highlight this problem and have
occupied a considerable portion of the Soviet leadership's attention.
Demographically, the percentage of the population of Russian ethnicity is falling
3 Soviet Military Power (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1989 edition). Preface.
^Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika ( New York: Harper and Row, 1987, Perrenial Library, 1988),
5.
5James Cracroft, ed., The Soviet Union Today, Second Edition (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1988), 198
11
and will pass below fifty percent by the year 2000. This poses problems for the
Soviet government in terms of meeting military manpower and industrial work
force goals, since both areas rely primarily on Russians (and Slavs) to fill these
requirements. A related concern is a rise in the Soviet Central Asian population,
who are ill-disposed to migrate to the industrial centers and are generally not
qualified for such work. Additionally, most Soviet Central Asians are Muslims.
The Soviet regime fears that Islamic Fundamentalism will spread to Soviet
Muslims. Such a development would be extremely destabilizing because it would
almost certainly be expressed in hostility to government control.
6
Other social trends also concern the Soviet leadership. Alcoholism is at an
alarming level and affects economic performance adversely. Health care is
inadequate, as evidenced by decreasing life expectancyJ
The Soviet military has grown and modernized throughout the decade of the
1980s to the point that it is now superior to the West in many regards: tanks,
helicopters, space launch capability, antisatellite weapons. 8 However, even if the
Soviets were intent on pursuing expansionist policies, the current correlation of
forces weighs against such action. In Europe, the Warsaw Pact is no longer a
reliable military coalition. In fact, Eastern European armies might resist Soviet
attempts to take control of their countries or to use their countries for a base for
attacks against the West. Without secure base areas, a Soviet attack along the
6Mikhail Heller and Aleksandr Nekrich, Utopia in Power (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1986; Summit Books, 1986), 676.
7James Cracroft, ed., The Souiet Union Today, Second Edition (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1988), 362.
^Soviet Military Power (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Government
Printing Office, 1989 edition), 133 135.
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Central Front of Europe would have a greatly diminished chance of success. A
direct attack upon Norway from Soviet territory is feasible, but such an action
would risk general war with NATO. In such a situation, the Eastern European
"buffer" states would actually insulate the industrial heartland ofWestern Europe
from invasion by Soviet ground forces. Conversely, Soviet territory adjoining
Norway would come under conventional attack from the outset.
Moving to the Far East, the benefits of an attack on the Peoples' Republic of
China would not be worth the cost. Since the conquest of China would require
more resources than the Soviets could muster, any invasion would be for limited
gains from the outset. However, any move of a sufficient scope to be worthwhile
would provoke Chinese retaliation and, while the Peoples' Liberation Army is no
match for Soviet combined arms, it remains a large fighting force and could wage
a long war that would be extremely costly to the Soviet Union. When one considers
the fact that any long war might increase the temerity of the different nationalist
groups within the Soviet Union and further exacerbate internal unrest to the point
of large scale civil war, a Soviet attack on China appears very unlikely.
A look at the nations on the southern border of the Soviet Union leads to the
conclusion that a Soviet attack upon any one or more of these nations would be
extremely unlikely. The experience in Afghanistan is still fresh in the minds of
Soviet policy makers, and the Soviets could expect similar experiences if they were
to attack the Turks or the Iranians. Additionally, Turkey's status as a member of
NATO, and Iran's oil reserves, its proximity to the other oil rich Middle Eastern
states, and its warm water Indian Ocean ports make Western intervention to stop
such aggression all but ensured.
13
The remaining options - an attack on Finland, Sweden or the United States
itself-- are also unlikely at the present time. While the size and nonaligned status
of Sweden and Finland would make Soviet conquest possible, the outcry from the
world's nations over such an action and the attendant curtailment of economic ties
that would ensue make such a course of action unwise at least until the Soviets
have restored their economy to some semblance of health and vitality. A
conventional attack on the United States would, as in the case of China, fail from
lack of resources unless the desired gains were quite limited. In such a case, a long
war might once again ensue, or, at the very least, foreign economic cooperative
arrangements would end. Moreover, the threat of central nuclear war would be a
distinct possibility. While a nuclear attack on the United States would neutralize
it as a world power, the Soviet Union would run the risk of being neutralized as
well by America's guaranteed second strike capability.
In the Third World, the Soviets have already curtailed their adventurism.
The best example of this has been the Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Even the use of surrogate forces appears to be on the verge of termination as the
Soviets grow weary of the cost of supporting Cuba's iconoclastic regime. The
appeal of Soviet style Marxism-Leninism has waned in the Third World. 9 While
Moscow has not lost interest in the Third World 10 and will certainly attempt to
capitalize on American faux pas, it is unlikely that the Soviets will return to
expansionist policies until they have reinvigorated their economy and have
yKobert S. Litwak and Neil Macfarlane, "Soviet Activism in the Third World, "Survival 29, 1
(January/ February 1987): 25.
l0Soviet Military Power (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, U.S.Government
Printing Office, 1989 edition), 19.
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quelled internal political unrest. Until then, they can be expected to attempt to
gain influence by nonmilitary means. 1 1
While the Soviet military threat to the United States and the free world has
diminished, many areas of competition continue to exist. Specifically, arms control
talks and the battle for Western European and American public opinion will
continue to figure prominently in Moscow's strategy to maximize its political,
economic and military position relative to its competitors. The Soviets have
traditionally sought to derive strategic advantages from arms control and there is
no reason to assume that they have altered this approach. Improved standing in
the eyes of Western publics will help them return the Soviet economy to health as
soon as possible. By appearing non-threatening, the Soviets may actually bring
about sizable reductions in the armed forces of their adversaries and improve the
correlation of forces even though their economy remains sluggish. A non-
threatening posture will also facilitate their efforts to obtain Western technology,
both legally and illegally, by fostering less restrictive Western export controls and
by reducing the attentiveness ofWestern regulatory agencies.
C. U.S. RELATIONS WITH ITS ALLIES
Common interests bind alliances together. While similar forms of
government, common cultural bonds and participation in the same economic
system are sources of cohesion for the United States and its allies, the shared
vision of a common enemy has been the strongest contributor to alliance
HAlvin Z Rubinstein, Soviet Foreign Policy Since World War II, Third Edition. Scott,
Foresman/Little, Brown Series in Political Science (Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman and
Company, 1989), 367-368.
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solidarity. 12 As the Cold War has subsided, the perception of a common enemy has
become clouded. Alliance members have begun to express differences that had
previously been judged as unimportant compared to the need to present a united
face to the threat. 1 3
NATO, as the strongest and most highly developed alliance, is a good
example of how this process has operated. Many of the social, political, military
and economic realities that made NATO necessary have changed radically over
the past 40 years. Essentially, NATO was founded to stabilize a world
characterized by:
• a hostile and aggressive USSR whose preponderance in conventional military
forces posed a real threat to the continued sovereignty of Western Europe.
Additionally, the existence of various European Communist parties,
sponsored and manipulated by the Soviet Union, made the threat of internal
subversion very real for many Western European governments.
• a Western Europe whose economies had been destroyed, and which therefore
could not mount a defense of its own.
• an America whose economy was vastly superior to all others (accounting for
50% of total world production in the immediate post war years).
• an America that possessed a monopoly in nuclear weapons.
• a world that was fearful of rearming Germany and Japan.
In 1990, every one of these factors has been overturned. Today's world is
characterized by:
12Stephen S. Szabo, "Public Opinion and the Alliance: European and American Perspectives on
NATO and European Security" in Stanley R. Sloan, ed., NATO in the 1990's (Washington, DC:
Pergamon-Brassey's,1989), 105.
i3Ronald Steel, "NATO's Last Mission," Foreign Policy 76 (Fall 1989): 84-85.
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• a USSR that behaves like a traditional great power, but one whose power is
presently waning. In such a role, the USSR is interested in the stability of
Western Europe, not in its conquest, for it needs Western Europe to provide
the loans and other credits to make the restructuring of her economy
possible. 14 Additionally, the emergence of "Eurocommunism", often hostile
to Moscow's policies, has all but eliminated the threat of internal subversion
to Western European governments.
• an economically rebuilt and revitalized Western Europe -- one that
increasingly challenges and competes with America for world market share.
• an America that is still the leading economic power of the world, but which
now accounts for only 18.4% (1983 data) of world production. 15
• an America that is inferior to the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons.
Additionally, Britain and France now field their own strategic deterrents,
and other nations possess a nuclear capability or will soon have one.
• a West Germany and Japan that have embraced democracy to such a degree
that a resurgence of Fascism is highly unlikely. Rearming both these nations
should help Western defense rather than endanger it. 16
Many European nations have developed strategic interests that are
irreconcilable with those of the United States. First, in the event of a conventional
attack by Warsaw Pact forces that was proving successful, Western Europeans
would prefer to see early escalation to central nuclear war between the United
States and Soviet Union because such a development might spare Western Europe
from devastation. 17 Alternatively, American policy makers would like to see the
war terminated without resort to central forces. Such a scenario would involve
massive conventional war in Europe with the possible use of theater nuclear
»4Ibid.,9.Seealso
Stephen S Szabo, "Public Opinion and the Alliance: European and American Perspectives on
NATO and European Security," in Stanley R. Sloan, ed., NATO in the 1990's (Washington, D.C.:
Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), 148.





weapons and would leave large parts of Western Europe in ruins. America,
however, would be untouched. This difference in preferred outcomes is significant
because it discredits the doctrine of Flexible Response by rendering the American
extended deterrent to Europe incredible. Many Europeans do not believe that
Americans will risk the devastation of their own country over a dispute in Europe.
Without a credible extended deterrent for Europe, the Soviet leadership's concern
that an attack on NATO may lead to central nuclear war between the USSR and
the United States is lessened considerably.18
Second, conflicts have increasingly developed between the United States and
its NATO allies over "out of area" policies (e.g., U.S. and European policies toward
non-NATO areas of the world). These "disagreements" underscore existing
geographic and philosophical differences (between the U.S. and its European
NATO allies) and accentuate conflicting national interests. 19
Third, now that Western European nations have rebuilt their economies,
they have become competitors for markets with the United States. Japan has
pursued a similar course.
Some Americans point out that NATO gives Western Europeans the "best of
both worlds". Europeans enjoy U.S. military protection, including America's
nuclear guarantee (incredible as they may regard it), but do not have to suffer the
inconveniences of client states.20 The American defense shield is a low cost
i»/6id., 10. See also Irving Kristol, "Does NATO Exist?," in Kenneth A. Myers, ed., NATO, The
Next Thirty Years (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, 1980), 362.
•9Michael Stuermer, "lb NATO Still in Europe's Interest?", in Stanley R. Sloan, ed
,
NATO in
the 1990's (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), 108.
-'ORonald Steel, "NATO's Last Mission," Foreign Policy 76 (Fall, 1989): 86.
18
insurance policy. It allows European nations to use money that they would
normally use for defense for other purposes. Specifically, most Western European
nations possess more comprehensive social welfare programs than the United
States .21
If such areas of competition and outright disagreement continue, a
realignment or dissolution of present alliance structures can be anticipated. A
look at possible alternatives to NATO is helpful to place matters in perspective.
The following scenarios are possible in a post-NATO Europe. All involve the
withdrawal of U.S. forces and the closure of bases in Europe:
• A federalized Europe. In this case, Western Europe unites to provide for its
common defense. In this scenario, Western Europe would be one of the great
powers in a multipolar system. It would possess its own strategic nuclear
deterrent.
• A Europe des Etats. Although failing to achieve union, Western Europe forms
a strong alliance which provides for its own defense and gives it a large
degree of autonomy from Moscow and Washington. Such an outcome could be
the result of the devolution or Europeanization of the current NATO
structure. A separate European strategic nuclear deterrent would also exist
in this case.
• A Finlandized Europe. In the absence of U.S. military involvement, Western
Europe is increasingly intimidated by the Soviet Union and adopts either
neutral or pro-Soviet foreign policy positions.
• An occupied Europe. After U.S. forces leave Western Europe, the Soviets
attack and occupy it.2?
2» Michael Stuermer, "Is NATO Still in Europe's Interest?", in Stanley R. Sloan, ed., NATO in
the I990's (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey's, 1989), 108-109.
22Christopher Layne, "Ending the Alliance," Journal of Contemporary Studies 6, 3 (Summer
1983): 26.
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In the first two cases, the security of Europe would be preserved. The United
States would have to rely on diplomacy and statecraft to foster European-
American cooperation, a condition not really different from the present day. The
existence of a European nuclear deterrent should not concern the United States
any more than the present British and French deterrent forces. However, the
value of an independent European strategic nuclear force at deterring a Soviet
attack on Western Europe would exceed that of the present American extended
deterrent because it would be controlled by the nations whose territories and
populations are directly threatened.
The case of a Finlandized Europe is unlikely to develop overnight. The
United States has a natural advantage over the Soviet Union for the hearts of
Western Europeans through common political systems and cultural ties. It is
likely that Western Europe would unilaterally resist Finlandization. Timely
support from the United States could help fuel such resistance and possibly drive
the situation toward a Europe des Etats scenario or toward a resumption of direct
American military participation in a North Atlantic security alliance.
An occupied Europe should only arise if both Western Europeans and
Americans failed to take appropriate action in the face of a more hostile and
aggressive Soviet Union. Since the United States still considers the defense of
Western Europe to be indivisible from the defense of America, such a development
is unlikely.
If the Soviet threat continues to subside, NATO in its present form will no
longer be necessary to provide for the security of Western Europe. The Europeans
are already capable of providing for their own defense needs, and they will now
20
perceive them as greatly reduced from previous levels. If the Soviet threat were to
reemerge in a number of years, a non-NATO Western Europe would be more likely
to respond to the threat with increased defense spending than would one which was
still riding on America's defense coat tails.
As America's allies continue to become less dependent on the United States,
they will demand more of a say in alliance matters. Base rights will be denied or
restricted, as will troop stationing and overflight rights. Ship repair facilities
could become limited.
D. U.S. RELATIONS WITH THE THIRD WORLD: MILITARY TRENDS
1. Introduction
"Diminishing influence" and "increasing threat" summarize the most
striking trends in the United States' relations with the Third World. These trends
are the result of "power diffusion," i.e., a relative spreading of power from the two
predominant world superpowers to many other nations. While the superpowers
remain the strongest military powers, their relative power compared to the Third
World has declined. This situation is shared by all of the industrialized nations
that comprise the "North". Military, political and economic developments in the
nations of the "South" have created this situation.
Although the quantity of military power still clearly favors the United
States and should continue to do so for the foreseeable future, the gap between the
quality of the military capabilities of North and South has narrowed considerably.
The following trends have been instrumental in this process:
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• Ballistic missile proliferation,
• Proliferation of Sea Launched Cruise Missiles,
• Proliferation of nuclear and chemical warheads, and
• Proliferation of advanced and "smart" weapons.
2. Ballistic Missile Proliferation
During the 1980s, the number of countries possessing ballistic missiles
has expanded well beyond the five traditional nuclear powers comprised of the
United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the Soviet Union. Many
Third World nations now possess conventionally armed short and intermediate
range ballistic missiles. Iran and Iraq have already used them, some armed with
chemical warheads, against civilian population centers during their recent war.
Opponents of ballistic missile proliferation, a group led by the United States,
believe that the introduction of ballistic missiles into a region is inherently
destabilizing for the following reasons:
• the short flight time of ballistic missiles compared to other weapons delivery
systems makes them most useful in a surprise attack role,
• the high speed and oftentimes high trajectory of ballistic missiles give them a
high likelihood of penetrating all current anti-air defenses, and
• conventionally armed ballistic missiles may be modified to deliver chemical
or even nuclear warheads.
In light of these factors, a nation that believes it is about to be subjected
to ballistic missile attack will be disposed to conduct a preemptive strike against
its enemy's ballistic missile sites "before it is too late"23 . War might thus be
23 Martin S. Navias, "Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Middle East," Suruiua\ XXXI, 3
(May/June 1989): 225,231
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triggered in situations where diplomacy would have diffused the situation if the
fear of surprise attack had not been present. As the range of the ballistic missiles
held by Third World nations increases, more and more nations will feel threatened,
and will probably seek to deter ballistic missile attack by acquiring their own
ballistic missile forces. Proliferation will affect the superpowers. For example,
The continued spread of missile technology in the Third World poses a
number of policy dilemmas for the United States, not the least of which is
the impact on the future conduct of U.S. military operations. The growing
sophistication of missile arsenals in countries which may be willing to incur
the risk of attacking U.S. forces will certainly complicate decisions about
whether and when to intervene in regional conflicts, and, at a minimum,
force the United States and other great powers to take additional steps to
protect overseas military installations. 24
Ultimately, ballistic missile proliferation will destabilize on a global
scale as the superpowers themselves become subject to ballistic missile attack,
possibly armed with nuclear warheads, from Third World nations. Additionally,
as ballistic missile proliferation spreads to unstable regimes, the chance that one
or more missiles will be seized by radical political or terrorist groups increases
proportionately. 25
3. Sea Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM) Proliferation
The proliferation of Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCM's) to numerous
Third World nations is a development of particular interest to naval planners. The
very attributes that have made SLCMs a preferred weapon of the U.S. Navy for
24Jahne E. Nolan,"Ballistic Missiles in the Third World - The Limits of Nonproliferation,"
Arms Control Today (November 1989): 9.
25
"Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Developing World," in World Military Expenditures and
Arms Transfers 1988 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1989), 17. See also
Robert D. Shuey and others, ed., Missile Proliferation: Survey of Emerging Missile Forces
(Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1988), Summary page.
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anti-ship attack - low detectability, difficult to counter if detected, excellent
accuracy, long iunge - have made them formidable weapons when possessed by an
adversary. The Iraqi's and Argentines have already demonstrated the ability to
use them effectively.2^
SLCMs are also effective land strike weapons. The difficulty in detecting
SLCMs more than compensates for their slow flight speed. SLCMs pose an
essentially undetectable first strike weapon. Moreover, the coordinated use of
SLCMs and attack aircraft can produce synergistic effects: SLCMs first suppress
antiaircraft defenses, allowing aircraft to strike the target while incurring greatly
reduced losses.
If mated with nuclear or chemical warheads, SLCMs become weapons of
mass destruction. When mated with their ability to achieve a successful surprise
first strike, nuclear SLCMs increase the likelihood of accidental nuclear war in
much the same way as ballistic missiles. 2
"
Some theorists who are not yet ready to agree that today's nuclear
SLCMs are destabilizing are quick to point out that the next generation of SLCMs,
which will probably incorporate "stealth" technology, will be an effective first
2GLessons of (he Falkland* Summary Report. (Washington, DC: Department of the Navy,
February 1983). See also
The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for
Defense (Londonller Majesty's Stationery Office, December 1982.
-
>7Kobert 1). Shuey and others, ed., Missile Proliferation Suruey of Emerging Missile Forces,
(Washington, DC the Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress 1988), 202.
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strike weapon for dealing a "decapitating strike". These SLCMs will be extremely
destabilizing28
?
especially as they proliferate to less stable regimes.
4. Proliferation of Nuclear and Chemical Warheads
As previously alluded to, nuclear proliferation has occurred to countries
such as China and India , and it is likely that additional nations such as Israel,
Iraq, Iran, Libya, Pakistan, Brazil, Argentina, North Korea and South Africa will
soon possess nuclear weapons (if they do not already possess them). Additionally,
chemical weapons have proliferated to a much greater degree. Twenty different
countries are currently suspected of having them or are in the process of
developing them.29 Chemical weapons have already been used during the Iran-
Iraq War; in a sense, this has broken the psychological barrier to their use which
has existed since World War I.
5. Proliferation of "Smart Weapons"
A wide variety of weapons utilizing high technology and even some so-
called "smart" weapons 311 have proliferated to many Third World nations. In
addition to SLCM's and ballistic missiles, modern antitank missiles and anti-
aircraft weapons have greatly improved the defensive capabilities of Third World
armed forces. Other technologies, such as the use of satellite communications and
-^Stanley K. Sloan, Alva M Bowen, Jr. and Ronald O'Rourke, The Implications For Strategic
Arms Control of Nuclear Armed Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (Washington, D C: Congressional
Research Service, The Library of Congress, 1985), 6-7.
29Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Arms Control After the Cold War," Foreign Affairs (Winter 1989/90): 55.
A smart weapon is one which performs a large share of required checkout, initialization,
navigation, guidance, counter counter measures, arming, "kill" and kill assessment functions at
least as well as a human using the same information and subjected to the same environment." For
additional information, see
Patrick Parker, "Will Smart Weapons Become Decisive in Military Engagements?" Current
working notes, 1989
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encrypted field radios have made it more difficult to gain intelligence data on
military intentions. Smart weapons will increase the casualties and overall cost of
military intervention by the North into conflicts involving the South. The
considerable losses to British naval forces at the hands of the Argentine Air Force
during the Falklands War is a case in point.
6. Feasibility of Slowing or Reversing These Trends
The industrialized nations can slow these trends but cannot reverse
them. First, a number of developing nations have developed indigenous defense
industries that depend on export markets to generate production runs of sufficient
scale to keep them solvent. 31 Some of these countries have chosen to concentrate
resources in the production of a particular type of weapons system and have
excelled in these areas. For example, Israel leads the world in the production of
remotely piloted airborne vehicles. It is likely that other developing nations that
already possess indigenous electronics industries, civilian nuclear power programs
and even space programs (Brazil, India) will be able to produce "smart" weapons
some day. These industries presently depend on technological assistance from
western governments and business firms, and restricting the degree of technology
transfer from the North to the South could be used to slow down development.
However, such measures will only be partially effective because:
• illegal technology transfer and theft exist,
• many technologies have "dual use" aspects, i.e., they have both civilian and
military uses, and are therefore difficult to regulate, and
31 Michael Brzoska and Thomas Ohlson, Arms Transfers to the Third World, 1971-85 (New
York: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, Oxford University Press, 1987), 112.
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• the newly industrialized nations can cooperate with each other to achieve
some degree of synergy in the development of advanced weaponry.
The use of export restrictions by the North on high tech equipment and
technology to the South cannot help but create resentment in the South. The fact
that the North wishes to deny the South from obtaining capabilities that the North
already possesses appears hypocritical to the South and inclines the countries
involved to refuse to participate in regimes that appear biased in favor of the
North. For example, many developing nations that export indigenously produced
arms do not require End User Certificates, a device used by the traditional arms
exporting nations in an attempt to prevent weapons from reaching unstable or
expansionist regimes. 32 The failure to require End Use Certification by these so-
called "Second Tier Suppliers" promises that advanced weapons, once developed,
will proliferate to some degree despite the existence of control regimes.
E. U.S./THIRD WORLD POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS
Political and economic trends also indicate that many Third World nations
will become increasingly nonaligned with either East or West. First, Nationalism,
often believed to be on the wane in the developed world, is thriving in the South.
Increased nationalistic fervor has led many Third World nations to decry
continuing "exploitation" by the North. The steadily worsening economic gap
between the industrialized world and the Third World continues to increase
feelings of resentment in the underdeveloped world. As a result, many developing
^'-Robert I). Shuey, Warren W. Lenhart, Rodney A. Snyder, Warren H. Donnelly, James E.
Mielke and John D. MotelT, Missile Proliferation: Survey of Emerging Missile Forces (Washington
DC: Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, 1988), 88-642 F. , 94.
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nations have strictly regulated foreign business interests, and have adopted
foreign policies that are increasingly independent from either the United States or
the Soviet Union. The proliferation of advanced weaponry has made developing
nations more confident in adopting nonaligned policies. In part, the resentment
felt by the South has stimulated development of the indigenous arms industries
that will allow the South to remain more independent despite control regimes.
Nationalism, as well as transnational ideologies such as Islamic
Fundamentalism and Pan-Arab Nationalism, have increased tensions among
Third World nations in many regions. Arab-Israeli tensions, the Iran-Iraq War,
friction between Pakistan and India, and the continuing instability in Indochina
are cases in point.
In conclusion, the increased ideological fervor of many Third World nations
will continue to motivate them to acquire advanced weaponry and to develop
indigenous (or at least non-superpower) sources of supply. They will continue to
pursue foreign policies increasingly divorced from Washington's or Moscow's, and
in many cases inimical or at least competitive with them. As the strength of
nationalism and other ideologies grows, regional hostilities will continue and will
be less and less receptive to manipulation by the superpowers. Such events are
bound to threaten United States vital national interests in many ways while
making U.S. military intervention increasingly costly.
F. NONMILITARY DEVELOPMENTS THREATENING AMERICA
Certain trends, while not directly military in nature, will affect U.S. national
security by further eroding American military superiority over the rest of the
world. First, excessive technology transfer, legal or illegal, will endanger the
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preeminence in high technology that has enabled the United States to remain on
the leading edge of military technology. A significant breakthrough in some new
area of military technology, and the subsequent integration of this technology into
a weapon system, could shift the military balance against the United States until
an appropriate countermeasure was devised. During this period, Washington's
ability to protect vital national interests would be degraded. 33
Second, the increasing complexity of advanced weapons systems requires
that both raw materials and various finished components come from foreign as
well as domestic sources. It is likely that the United States will continue to become
more dependent on foreign nations for its defense needs as it moves into a post-
industrial society. Loss of one or more suppliers (due to dissolution of an alliance,
alteration of the foreign policy of a Third World nation, interruption of commerce
by a Third World conflict, or revived expansionism by the Soviet Union or other
world power) could have significant repercussions on America's ability to provide
for her security.
G. SUMMARY
The foregoing discussion indicates that threats to United States national
interests will persist as the future unfolds. Despite prevailing attitudes on the
decreasing utility of military force as an instrument of policy, some of these threats
33 T7ie Future Security Enuironment. Report of the Future Security Environment Wurking
Group, submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy. By Andrew W. Marshall
and Charles Wolf, Working Group Chairmen, (Washington, DC, October 1988), 61-62.
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doubtless will require the use of American combat forces for successful
resolution. 34
The emerging threats are likely to have the following characteristics:
• They will occur throughout the globe and are likely to lack a direct East-West
superpower confrontation component.
• They most likely will occur in the Third World. (This is nothing new. Of the
200 crises in which U.S. naval forces have participated since World War II,
the majority have occurred in the Third World.) Accordingly, the probability
that an unstable government will be involved increases.
• They will involve high tech weapons on both sides, and may include the use of
nuclear weapons or some other weapon of mass destruction (chemical or
biological weapons). Civilian populations may be at risk in such hostilities,
including portions of the U.S. population.
• The ability of the belligerents to prosecute the military action in question will
not depend on resupply by either superpower. Accordingly, the superpowers
will be unable to control escalation by withholding supplies as each has done
in the past.
U.S. allies will view these threats through lenses of increasingly divergent
national interests and will therefore respond differently. The perception of the
Soviet Union's ultimate intentions will continue to be the most significant factor in
the U.S. planning equation. If U.S. defense planners continue to plan against the
Soviet threat when such a threat no longer exists or has become of limited
significance, valuable resources will be squandered at a time when they are needed
for other purposes such as economic restructuring and reinvigoration. Conversely,
34For a study demonstrating the generally poor results obtained from economic sanctions
alone, see
Doxey, Margaret, "Economic Sanctions: Benefits and Costs " The World Today (December 1980):
484- 489.
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if the Soviet threat is underrated, the U.S. will find itself without the necessary
military force structure to deter revived Soviet expansionism.
Unfortunately, America's economic situation and some very pressing
domestic concerns discussed in Chapter Five are going to restrict funding levels for
defense to the minimum necessary to do the job. While many would say that such
has always been the case - during the Reagan presidency, naval planners were
tasked with fighting a three ocean war with a naval establishment configured for a
one and a half ocean war35 . future military planners will see extremely frugal
funding levels that will make the past ones seem extravagant (unless some shock
to the system occurs, such as a rapid Soviet arms build-up). To be able to field
forces suitable for dealing with tomorrow's crises, planners must define the nature
of the threat, and then must strive vigorously to gain both government and public
support for their views.
35David C. Hendrickson, The Future of American Strategy (New York: Holmes and Meier, Inc.
19871,163-164.
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III. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW THREAT FOR STRATEGIC
PLANNING
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter presents a new planning paradigm that U.S. defense planners
should use to deal with the changing threat. It assumes that the threat has
changed sufficiently to make the traditional strategies of containment
dysfunctional.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, strategic planners ideally design
forces to counter an opponent's capabilities, but, at some point, they must make
some judgment regarding his intentions. Such an approach is sensible because the
actual level of danger posed by a threat is a function of the military forces
possessed by a potentially hostile government, including their training levels,
logistics capability and the condition of their equipment, and the likelihood that a
hostile regime will use their forces against the United States. Where the
probability of threat is low, planners are justified in focusing their efforts
elsewhere. For example, American defense planners do not design forces to
counter the threat of a Canadian attack along the northern border of the United
States despite the fact that Canada maintains a modern, professional fighting
force. Nor is it accurate to state that the ability to deal with such a threat can be
subsumed under a force structure designed to counter a Soviet attack. A Canadian
attack upon the United States most probably would consist of attacks on high
value targets by light, highly mobile forces as well as acts of sabotage by
commando units that could chose the time and place of each attack. U.S. Army
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units configured for frontal warfare along the Central Front of Europe would be
poorly equipped to deal with such tactics, much as the French Army was
ineffective against Algerian rebels until it reconfigured a number of units for low
intensity conflict. U.S. Army units already designed for low intensity conflict
would be effective but too small in number to interdict the infiltration of Canadian
forces along America's roughly 3000 mile long northern border. Attacks on
Canada's military installations would hurt the Canadians, but might have
difficulty attriting Canadian forces engaged in guerrilla warfare.
While the above discussion might seem ridiculous, it serves to demonstrate
the point that strategic planners must make judgments regarding the probability
that a foreign government will use its armed forces against the United States, its
citizens or its interests abroad. It is only after a government or organization has
been judged "hostile" to the United States that planning focuses on countering its
military capabilities alone.
The changing nature of the threat indicates that the Soviet Union poses less
of a threat today than at any time since World War II. In the words of George
Kennan:
...the Cold War image of that country (the USSR) ought now to be replaced by a
new one. This would be in many respects similar to the image of Russia we
entertained in the decades and centuries before the Revolution, but not
identical with it. It would be the image of a great power, having political
customs and traditions wholly different from our own, but in many respects
like other great powers -- a great power for which its neighbors presented
problems, which presented problems for its neighbors, which presented
problems for itself-- a power, in other words, whose leaders had many things to
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think about aside from just their relations with us -- a power, whose interests,
while not always by any means coincident with our own (this was hardly to be
expected), nevertheless did not constitute an immediate or overriding threat to
our security. 36
Such an interpretation is not to say that the security environment has
become more stable; in fact, threats to U.S. national interests continue to
proliferate. They have arguably grown more difficult to counter because of their
variety, wide dispersal throughout the globe, and the increased role played by
unstable regimes. 37
To fully appreciate this development, it is necessary to assess exactly what is
meant by the terms "U.S. national interest" and "vital U.S. national interest".
Only then can one look past East-West rivalries and begin to see that a new
strategic planning paradigm is in order.
B. A LOOK AT THE NATURE OE U.S. NATIONAL INTERESTS
The bipolar system of the last forty-five years has fostered the consensus that
the containment of Soviet expansionism was a vital U.S. national interest. While
Soviet actions since World War II have threatened vital U.S. national interests,
containing Soviet expansionism was a strategy for protecting these interests
rather than a national interest in itself.
36George F. Kennan, Encyclopedia Brilannica Lecture on evolving changes in the
international system. D elivered at Stanford University, March 15, 1989,9.
^The Future Security Environment. Report of the Future Security Environment Working
Group, submitted to the Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy, by Andrew W. Marshall
and Charles Wolf, Working Group Chairmen (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
October 1988) 3-44.
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Statements of the national interests of the United States by various policy
makers have been remarkably consistent over the years. In 1948, George Kennan
wrote that foreign policy should seek to enhance the following interests:
• to protect the security of the nation, by which is meant the continued ability
of (the United States) to pursue the development of its internal life without
serious interference, or threat of interference, from foreign powers; and
• to advance the welfare of its people, by promoting a world order in which this
nation can make the maximum contribution to the peaceful and orderly
development of other nations and derive maximum benefit from their
experiences and abilities.38
Two years later, NSC-68 stated:
The fundamental purpose of the United States is laid down in the Preamble to
the Constitution:'... to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure
domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general
welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity.' In
essence, the fundamental purpose is to assure the integrity and vitality of our
free society, which is founded upon the dignity and worth of the individual.39
Most recently, President Bush enumerated America's national interests as follows:
• The survival of the United States as a free and independent nation, with its
fundamental values intact and its institutions and peoples secure.
• A healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure opportunity for individual
prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at home and abroad.
a8John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, Inc., 1982),
27.
^National Security Council (NSC) 68: A Report to the National Security Council by the
Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950,
appendix in The Evolution ofAmerican Strategic Doctrine: Paul H. Nitze and the Soviet Challenge,
Steven L. Reardon, Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns
Hopkins University, SAIS Paper No. 4 in International Affairs. Boulder, Co.: (The Westview Press,
1984), 90.
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• A stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights, and
democratic institutions.
• Healthy, cooperative and politically vigorous relations with allies and
friendly nations.40
Any attempt to demarcate vital and non-vital interests is very subjective.
Additionally, the importance afforded a particular interest is likely to change over
time as domestic and international political climates fluctuate. However, policy
makers must attempt to define those interests that they consider "vital". Since
nations are most likely to use military force to protect vital interests if other
methods fail, military planners should optimize force structure to deal with these
probable threats. Without such guidance, planners will be faced with two options.
They can design forces to counter all threats, which would be quite expensive and
would probably fail anyway because of the wide variety of threats likely to be
encountered, or they can make their own judgments concerning which interests
are vital, and optimize force design to counter threats to those interests.41
American military force will have no power to affect certain vital national
interests. For example, it will play no direct role in solving economic problems.
Also, the benefits of its use to foster political freedom and human rights in other
nations will probably not outweigh its costs in terms of lost American lives, as the
Vietnam War demonstrated. 4 - The fact that few Third World nations have
^National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: Government Printing
Office, January 1987), 2-3
41 For a discussion of these choices, see
Donald Nuechterlein, National Interest and Presidential Leadership (Boulder, Co.: Westview
Press, 1978).
42Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University
Press, 1986), 129
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actually achieved the level of representative government that Americans envision
when they speak of "democracy" further rules against any medium or large scale
U.S. military involvement in regional conflicts for human rights reasons.
American public opinion would soon turn against such involvement when it
became apparent that the U.S. client was not much better in this area than its
opponents.
The most fundamental role of armed forces is to ensure the nation's survival.
Today and for the foreseeable future, America's strategic nuclear deterrent fulfills
this role by countering the strategic nuclear forces of the Soviet Union, the only
threat capable of forcefully destroying the United States. Preservation of an
effective nuclear deterrent force will remain a priority of the highest order.
However, reductions in the size of U.S. and Soviet strategic forces will probably
occur through the mechanism of arms control talks. Under such conditions, any
cheating will have increased effects and will be increasingly destabilizing as
arsenal sizes shrink.
If East-West tensions continue to decline, the uses for U.S. conventional
military forces will change. Instead of deterring a Soviet attack on Western
Europe, they will be used to promote stability in various regions of the world and to
enhance credibility with needed allies by periodic presence. 4y Perhaps the
national leadership will also employ them to neutralize an advanced weapon
capability of a Third World nation or to gain access to resources that another
regime has interdicted. The mere presence of forces may provide a sufficient
^Discriminate Deterrence: Report of The Commission On Integrated Long-Term Strategy, by
Fred C. Ikle' and Albert Wohlstetter, Co-Chairmen (Washington, DC, U.S. Government Printing
Office, January 1988), 5-11.
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deterrent to prevent other nations from undertaking actions inimical to United
States' interests. In other cases, actual use of U.S. forces can be expected.
Differentiating between those threats that require military force for
deterrence purposes and those that are likely to require actual military
intervention, i.e., will not yield to economic and political measures, is a central
issue. Force structure should be optimized for cases that require intervention so
that U.S. forces will quickly achieve their objectives on such occasions (an outcome
which will enhance the credibility of deterrence in other situations). An argument
can be made that the opposite has been the case for the past several years; forces
have been designed to optimize the credibility of deterrence against the Soviet
threat, a threat that was becoming less and less probable, rather than for success
in more likely interventions of limited scope in the Third World. A belief in the
primacy of the need to contain the Soviet Union Union led to this development.
C. CONTAINMENT: THE TRADITIONAL PLANNING PARADIGM
1 . Description of the Traditional Planning Paradigm
The strategies of containment were designed to protect America's vital
national interests against an aggressive, hegemonic Soviet Union in the absence of
any other strong world power.
First, the defeat of Germany and Japan and the decline of the British and
French Empires have interacted with the development of the United States
and the Soviet Union in such a way that power has increasingly gravitated to
these two centers. Second, the Soviet Union, unlike previous aspirants to
hegemony, is animated by a new fanatic faith, antithetical to our own, and
seeks to impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world any
substantial further extension of the area under the domination of the Kremlin
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would raise the possibility that no coalition adequate to confront the Kremlin
with greater strength could be assembled. 44
A debate had raged in the late 1940s regarding the means to be used for containing
the Soviet Union. One side believed that containment could be accomplished by
primarily economic means. This side adhered to the view that the United States
should tolerate the existence of Communist regimes in countries if they did not
materially threaten the United States.45 The other side believed that containment
must have a sizable military component to be successful. Additionally, attempts to
subvert any government to communism posed a threat to the United States by
intimidating other nations and by decreasing the credibility of America's resolve
to defend freedom.46 The last sentence of the preceding quote cast American policy
toward the latter approach. Whether or not another approach would have been
more successful is a moot point; a militarily oriented view toward containment was
adopted and proved successful at limiting Soviet expansionism into the areas of
vital U.S. interest - Western Europe, the countries of the Mediterranean and
Middle East, including the Persian Gulf, and Japan and the Philippines.47
American strategic planners operationalized this view of containment by
adopting a "perimeter defense" against the Soviet Union and by designing forces to
^National Security Council (NSC) 6H: A Report to the National Security Council by the
Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950,
appendix in The Evolution of American Strategic Doctrine: Paul H. Nitze and the Soviet
Challenge, Steven L. Reardon, Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies,
the Johns Hopkins University, SA1S Paper No 4 in International Affairs. Boulder, Co.: (The
Westview Press, 1984), 89
45John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 90-
91
MJbid., 90-91
47/ftj d , 30.
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counter the most likely Soviet military operations around this perimeter.
Containment has gone through a number of permutations since 1947:
• George Kennan's original strategy of containment, largely implemented by
the Truman administration between 1947 and 1949;
• the assumptions from NSC-68, put into effect between 1950 and 1953 as a
result of the Korean War;
• the Eisenhower-Dulles "New Look," which lasted from 1953 to 1961;
• the Kennedy-Johnson "flexible response" strategy, 1961-1969;
• the concept of "detente" put forward by Nixon and Kissinger in the early
1970's, and continued in effect by both Presidents Ford and Carter until the
invasion of Afghanistan in 1979.48
Despite shifts in emphasis, all retained the Soviet Union as the principal threat to
America's vital national interests, and defense planners designed forces to deal
with this threat.
2. Evolution of the Traditional Planning Paradigm
The strategy of containment was adopted to counter the threat posed by a
hostile and aggressive USSR whose preponderance in conventional military forces
posed a real threat to the continued sovereignty of Western Europe. Additionally,
the existence of various European Communist parties, sponsored and manipulated
by the Soviet Union, made the threat of internal subversion of Western European
governments very real. The war had destroyed the economies of Western Europe,
making Western European governments incapable of defending themselves.
As previously discussed, the USSR now behaves more or less like a
"traditional" great power, but one whose power is waning. In such a role, the
48/fciJ.ix.
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USSR is interested in the stability of Western Europe, not in its conquest, for it
needs Western Europe to provide the loans and other credits to make the
restructuring of her economy possible. 49 Additionally, the emergence of
"Eurocommunism", often hostile to Moscow's policies, has all but eliminated the
threat of internal subversion to Western European governments. An economically
rebuilt and revitalized Western Europe is capable of defending itself. It can serve
to contain Soviet expansionism in the West if it feels that such a strategy is
necessary. In the East, Japan can serve a similar function. Both West Germany
and Japan have embraced democracy to such a degree that a resurgence of Fascism
is highly unlikely.50
In the years following World War II, the periphery of the USSR was
composed of many newly independent or newly liberated states - India, Pakistan,
Korea, Iraq, Syria, Israel. China was in chaos. All of these nations constituted
fertile ground for Soviet expansionism. Today, the nations on the Soviet periphery
have recovered and possess various capabilities to resist Soviet expansionism.
The fact that the U.S. government has focused on containing Soviet
expansionism has not prevented the loss of regimes and areas deemed vital to U.S.
national interests. While the containment strategy has limited Soviet gains, it has
not prevented the fall of friendly governments to nationalist forces, such as
occurred Iran. In other cases, nationalist movements portrayed their causes in an
49Ronald Steel, "NATO's Last Mission," Foreign Policy 76 (Fall 1989):9
See also
Stephen S. Szabo, "Public Opinion and the Alliance: European and American Perspectives on
NATO and European Security," in Stanley R. Sloan, ed
,




East-West confrontational light in order to gain aid from one or the other super
power. The containment strategy inclined American policy makers to see many
regional disputes as part of the East-West rivalry when such was not the case.
As the threat continues to change, continued adherence to a containment
doctrine will distort America's perception of the threat and result in less than
optimal foreign policy decisions and, along with them, improper military force
planning. 51
D. PROPOSAL OF A NEW PLANNING PARADIGM
The United States should replace the containment strategy with one that
emphasizes healthy competition in pursuit of America's national interests. Under
such a strategy, military forces would:
• Continue to provide a credible strategic nuclear deterrent to attack by the
Soviet Union or any other nuclear power so inclined and,
• Intervene to secure a vital national interest after other means, including the
use of military forces as a deterrent or an agent of intimidation, have failed.
The new paradigm is predicated on a number of assumptions. First and
foremost, the USSR must be viewed as a territorially satisfied power, as well as
one inclined to refrain from gaining influence in the Third World through military
power. Adoption of the new paradigm does not require that one believe that the
Soviet Union has permanently abandoned expansionist tendencies ("traditional"
^^Discriminate Deterrence: Report of The Commission On Integrated Long-Term Strategy, by
Fred C. Ikle' and Albert Wohlstetter, Co-Chairmen (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, January 1988), 2.
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great powers are often expansionist), but only that it will refrain from exercising
them in the foreseeable future.
The second assumption presumes that some sort of meaningful dialogue with
the Soviet Union is possible. This will enable U.S. policy makers and defense
planners to feel reasonably secure that Soviet statements and observed actions
mirror Soviet intentions. The identification of common interests will go a long way
to make meaningful dialogue possible, as will the increased openness of Soviet
society and policy making if Glasnost continues and the Soviets acknowledge the
need for the free flow of information required by a modern, industrial society.
However, allowing for the years of mistrust and suspicion that have existed
between the two superpowers, the continued existence of comprehensive
intelligence gathering capabilities, such as those provided by National Technical
Means, the continued use of on site verification, and the initiation of some form of
effective sanction for cheating on arms control agreements (which does not exist at
the present time) will be necessary. 52
Third, the paradigm assumes that no other power is capable of endangering
the existence of the United States for the foreseeable future.
Fourth, the assumption is made that the policy for advancing U.S. interests
without the use of U.S. combat forces whenever possible, and the limited
52Ronald Reagan, The President's Unclassified Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms
Control Agreements, 2 December 1988.
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conditions under which U.S. combat forces will be committed on foreign
territory^, has been successful and will continue to be a viable policy.
Fifth, the belief that the United States should not fund the defense needs of
other nations that are capable of defending themselves is implicit in the new
paradigm.
The sixth assumption observes that war between liberal democracies has
become virtually nonexistent, and assumes that such will continue to be the case.
However, it acknowledges that other forms of important competition exist,
specifically economic competition. The new paradigm assumes that the United
States cannot afford to devote resources to defend against low probability threats
(such as the threat of a Soviet/Warsaw Pact attack on Western Europe) and still
compete effectively in the global economy.
Seventh, the presence of certain trends that will foster cooperation among
states is assumed to exist, making the need for military force less pressing.
Common awareness of environmental pollution, the increased consensus on the
desirability of democratic forms of government, and the inevitable
interculturization caused by mass media helps people of different nations focus on
shared values rather than opposing ones.
Lastly, the paradigm assumes that the tendency to quantify many issues into
an East-West component has become dysfunctional. Washington has supported
oppressive regimes because they espoused an anticommunist line when, in fact,
they followed many policies contrary to United States interests. The new
paradigm will facilitate the assessment of foreign regimes in terms of these
^Casper W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," Defense 85 (January 1985): 10-1
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interests. In some cases, Soviet influence may be the problem. In others,
dictatorial rule may result in oppression without any involvement from Moscow.
In each case, the affect upon U.S. national interests will be the benchmark for
determining the U.S. government's course of action.
A review of America's four vital national interests, as enumerated in
President Bush's March 1990 National Strategy of the United States, helps to
place such a strategy in perspective.
The first interest seeks to ensure the survival of the United States as a free
and independent nation, with its fundamental values intact and its institutions
and people secure. Present world conditions pose minimal danger to the continued
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the United States. The USSR will be intent
on stabilizing its internal conditions for a number of years, all other medium
powers are democracies and have traditionally refrained from attacking each
other54
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and all other nations, including China, lack the capability to militarily
defeat the United States. However, as advanced weapons proliferate to more and
more nations, threats will exist to portions of the U.S. population. For example,
Libya might possess one or two thermonuclear weapons that it can target against
American cities. If Washington believed that these weapons might be used, U.S.
military forces might be tasked to conduct a preemptive strike on the Libyan
ICBM sites. Such a strike would be small scale and would utilize precision guided
$*Nutional Security Council (NSC) 68: A Report to the National Security Council by the
Executive Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950,
appendix in The Evolution ofAmerican Strategic Doctrine: Paul H. Nitze and the Soviet Challenge,
Steven L Reardon, Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns
Hopkins University, SAIS Paper No. 4 in International Affairs (Boulder, Co.: The Westview Press,
1984), 91.
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weapons and other unmanned platforms to destroy the site. Attacks on additional
targets, such as Libyan antiaircraft batteries and early warning radars, might also
occur at this time. In another scenario, U.S. forces might be called upon to rescue
American hostages being held in a foreign country. Such a mission would require
precise intelligence data, split second timing, and would require the attacking
force to achieve air superiority and local ground and naval superiority. It must be
noted that other things can endanger America's fundamental values. For example,
illegal drugs can erode productivity and respect for law and order. Perhaps the
military will be required to perform radical new missions to suppress the drug
trade in the future.
Second, policy makers desire a healthy and growing U.S. economy to ensure
opportunity for individual prosperity and a resource base for national endeavors at
home and abroad. While continuing achievement of this interest rests primarily
with economic policies, both foreign and domestic, the necessity for limited
military action to secure some vital resource or to protect foreign American
business interests cannot be ruled out. Again, such actions would be limited in
scope.
Third, a stable and secure world, fostering political freedom, human rights,
and democratic institutions is to be fostered. In the vast majority of cases, this
interest is served best by political and economic incentives and policies that
demonstrate to emerging nations that progress can best be encouraged through
policies that safeguard human rights and freedoms. In most cases, U.S. military
intervention can succeed at removing a tyrant from office who may pose an
impediment to democracy, but it cannot singlehandedly promote democracy.
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Moreover, the sight of U.S. military intervention into a Third World nation does
little to convince other nations that the United States is sincere in its desire to
promote and respect human rights. Accordingly, the use of U.S. military forces to
foster a stable, more democratic world should be limited primarily to cases where
their presence increases deterrence and stabilizes a region. In such scenarios,
Washington must ensure that it is supporting the side that actually fosters some
form of democracy. Otherwise, its policy will lose the support of the American
people and of the world public. Such considerations become all the more acute if
U.S. forces actually intervene; such policies may lose support even if a democratic
regime is the client if the public deems that the cost of military intervention
outweighs the benefits to the United States. Policy makers must pursue this
national interest with great care. They must remember that the American public
views a stable and secure world as less of a national interest than a stable and
secure domestic environment, and the interconnections between the two are not
always obvious to them (or obvious at all).
Lastly, the United States wishes to foster healthy, cooperative and politically
vigorous relations with allies and friendly nations. In relations with nations that
are truly "friendly," the need for military action should not go beyond a
requirement for some kind of presence and capability for interoperability among
the different armed forces involved to underscore the U.S.' resolve to support
treaty provisions.
Adoption of the new paradigm is not as radical as some might think. It lends
itself readily to incremental adoption. This fact is most readily apparent when one
considers what the new paradigm is not. The new paradigm:
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• is not a vehicle to insinuate isolationist policies into U.S. planning and policy
making. Interdependency among the world's nations will continue to grow;
continued improvement in world trade will profit American consumers and
raise their standards of living. As an interdependent nation, the United
States has vital national interests that can only be realized through
intercourse with other nations.
• is not anti-alliance. Alliances can cement favorable foreign relations,
including conditions for trade. They help to prevent crises between members
by providing a channel for dialogue. In times of crisis between alliances, they
improve the military balance in favor of the United States and, in bilateral
crises between the U.S. and another nation, they may provide some access to
foreign military facilities by U.S. forces.
• is not adversarial, aggressive or belligerent. Each nation is expected to
pursue its own legitimate national interests. As delineated by President
Bush, most nations will find America's definition of its national interests
appropriate except for authoritarian regimes, which will disagree with
AJnerica's policy of working to spread democracy. A U.S. focus on its global
interests rather than its East-West competition does not have to be done in a
belligerent manner. For example The U.S., Japan and Western Europe
compete economically and, thus far, have managed to remain on friendly
terms. As long as these nations perceive that the benefits of cooperation
outweigh antagonizing each other, this condition will continue. The United
States should pursue its national interests in a positive manner; certainly
there will be exceptions that require negative actions against a foreign
nation, but this should remain the exception rather than the rule.
• does not advocate disarmament. The United States must retain strong
military forces relative to the threat, and must provide a "warm" industrial
base for mobilization if and when mobilization becomes necessary. Military
forces will remain the final arbiter in disputes among nations, and no nation
can hope to remain a world leader without coercive ability. Additionally, it is
unlikely that the world's nations will develop a workable international
collective security apparatus in the true sense of the term anytime soon. 55
55For a discussion of the assumptions underlying the collective security concept, see
Philip E Jacob, Alexine L. Atherton and Arthur M Wallenstein, The Dynamics of International
Organization. Revised Edition (Homewood, II.: The Dorsey Press, 1972), 51-80. See also
National Security Council (NSC) 68: A Report to the National Security Council by the Executiue
Secretary on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950, appendix
in The Evolution ofAmerican Strategic Doctrine: Paul 11. Nitze and the Soviet Challenge, Steven L.
Reardon, Foreign Policy Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, the Johns Hopkins
University, SAIS Paper No. 4 in International Affairs. (Boulder, Co.: The Westview Press, 1984).
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Accordingly, the United States must retain sufficient military capability to
act unilaterally in defense of its vital interests.
The U.S. government is already striving to implement a new strategy while
being careful not to scare or antagonize U.S. allies. Some excerpts from President
Bush's National Security Strategy of the United States serve to demonstrate this
fact by posing the questions:
• How can we ensure continued international stability as U.S. -Soviet
bipolarity gives way to global interdependence and multi polarity?
• While maintaining a balance of power with the Soviet Union as an
inescapable American priority, how do we adapt our forces for the continuing
challenge of contingencies elsewhere in the world?
• How do we maintain the cohesion among allies and friends that remains
indispensable to common security and prosperity, as the perceived threat of a
common danger weakens?
• If military force looms less large in a world of a more secure East-West
balance, how shall we marshall the other instruments of policy to promote
our interests and objectives? 56
Adoption of the new paradigm will focus America's efforts on the task at
hand: preserving and enhancing its national interests in the future while
retaining its position of global leadership as the international system takes on an
increasingly multipolar character. The next chapter will address the impact of the
new paradigm on naval force structure and personnel organization. By
operationalizing the new paradigm for one armed service, its relevance for the
other elements of the armed forces and for U.S. policy making in general will
become better understood.
^National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government
Printing Office, March 1990). 7-8.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW PLANNING PARADIGM FOR U.S.
NAVY FORCE STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION
A. INTRODUCTION
What actually halts the aggressor's action is the fear of defeat ..., (even
though) he is not likely to concede this, at least not openly.
One may admit that even where the decision has been bloodless, it was
determined in the last analysis by engagements that did not take place but
had merely been offered ... where the tactical results of the engagement are
assumed to be the basis of all strategic plans, it is always possible, and a
serious risk, that the attacker will proceed on that basis. He will endeavor
above all to be tactically superior, in order to upset the enemy's strategic
planning. The latter therefore can never be considered as something
independent: it can only become valid when one has reason to be confident of
tactical success ... it is useful to emphasize that all strategic planning rests on
tactical success alone, and that - whether the solution is arrived at in battle or
not - this is in all cases the actual fundamental basis for the decision.
- von Clausewitz
The previous chapters have described how the nature of the threat has
evolved since World War II to the point that strategic planners need to adopt a new
paradigm for planning U.S. forces. This chapter considers the implications of the
new paradigm for naval force planning. In doing so, it compares the values of
certain principal characteristics, or variables, under old and new paradigms to
determine areas where changes in force requirements are appropriate. The
analysis is primarily qualitative in nature; recommendations tend to indicate
direction rather than "hard" calculations. For example, use of the new paradigm
may indicate that the Navy will require more auxiliary ships to support forward
operations by carrier battle groups, but it will not recommend the specific number
and class of the additional vessels required. Quantitative recommendations are
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avoided because the numbers of various ship and aircraft types required depend, in
part, on how many independent operations the national leadership wishes the
Navy to be capable of undertaking simultaneously in the future. Such a policy
decision is of the highest importance, and, while the Navy's leadership will not
make these ultimate decisions, they must advise the national leadership of what
can be accomplished by a U.S. Navy of various sizes before alterations in force size
occur. Unless capabilities are synchronized with operational requirements, policy
makers will find their strategies unworkable. Without synchronization of policy
and force structure, the realities of what a given naval force can accomplish results
in strategy becoming a "bottom up" process.
... strategy must rest on the bedrock of combat capability. One builds decisions
from the bottom up: tactics (a function of force structure and organization)
affect the efficacy of forces, the correlation of forces reveals what strategy our
forces can support, and a supportable military strategy governs national aims
and ambitions.
..., the OSD Defense Guidance, ... starts with national goals and policies,
which in due course defines strategy, and which all the time takes largely for
granted that the forces will be able to execute it.... If one is concerned with
present strategy, he must know current capabilities and design his strategy
accordingly. If forces are inadequate, then a strategy which is part bluff may
be necessary, but it is important for everyone to understand that the strategy
is in fact unexecutable, so that the part which is bluff does not become
forgotten and lead to self-delusion. 57
Strategy should be a "top down" process. Policy makers determine which
national interests may require the use of military force to protect. They inform the
military leadership of these cases, who then dictate the operational requirements
to which planners design their forces. Adoption of the new paradigm is
5?Wayne P. Hughes, CAPT, USN (Ret). "On the Integration of Naval Tactics and Maritime
Strategy." Prepared for delivery to the Conference on "Maritime Strategy: Issues and
Perspectives," Center for Naval Warfare Studies, U.S. Naval War College, Newport, R.I , 15-17
May 1985,1-2.
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meaningless at best, and self-defeating at worst, if American policy makers fail to
provide for appropriate force levels.
B. REQUIRED FORCE CAPABILITIES UNDER EACH PARADIGM
The U.S. Navy operationalized the containment paradigm during the first
two decades following World War II. U.S. naval strategy was not really codified,
however, until the advent of the Maritime Strategy in the early 1980s. As the
naval component of the National Military Strategy, the Maritime Strategy was
designed to support the National Strategy's "three pillars" of deterrence, forward
defense and alliance solidarity.
The Maritime Strategy uses forces in being to deter war with the Soviets by
both preparing for global war and by maintaining an ability to respond to crises
throughout the world. 5 & If deterrence fails and war with the Soviets ensues, the
Maritime Strategy emphasizes the fact that the lengthy construction time of
modern weapon systems and platforms requires that sizable, combat-ready naval
forces be on hand. These forces would seek sea control over vital sea lines of
communication (SLOCs) to make resupply of allied forces in Western Europe
possible. Additionally, they would conduct flanking attacks to distract the Soviets
from their main war objectives and would cause them to have to deal with a
multifront war.
Adoption of the Maritime Strategy required that U.S. naval forces possess
certain capabilities and adhere to particular deployment patterns:
58James D. Watkins, Admiral, U.S. Navy. "The Maritime Strategy," U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings (January 1986): 4-5.
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• First, the strategy required the existence of a large navy to be credible. U.S.
naval forces would operate in conjunction with allied navies in many areas,
but still had to be capable of taking the battle to the Soviet homeland in the
Pacific and opposing Soviet aggression in the Middle East singlehandedly.
• Second, this navy had to possess the ability to achieve sea control over large
ocean areas to keep the SLOCs open as well as to project power ashore
anywhere on the globe. A preference for near-simultaneous large scale
operations was implied.
• Third, the nature of the Soviet threat necessitated that the Navy be capable
of achieving dominance in all areas of warfare: surface, subsurface, air,
space, amphibious warfare and special warfare. Achievement of sea control
was thus defined in three dimensions: U.S. naval forces must be capable of
achieving air, surface and subsurface superiority.
• Fourth, the U.S. Navy had to be capable of prevailing in a high tech
environment, including electronic warfare that degraded weapons
performance as well as various measures to disrupt command, control and
communications systems. Additionally, systems had to be designed to
counter high density raids of various kinds and to deal with threats in
different dimensions simultaneously. These capabilities could only be
maintained by a large scale research and development (R&D) effort. This
effort was focused at defeating Soviet bloc weapons and electronic counter
measures.
• Fifth, the need to maintain alliance solidarity and bolster the resolve of
economically and militarily weak governments (initially including Western
Europe and Japan) to resist Soviet attempts at intimidation required that a
substantial portion of U.S. naval forces operate in a forward deployed fashion.
The requirement to be able to respond rapidly to Third World crises, often
precipitated by the Soviets, was seen as an additional reason for maintaining
a forward presence. The mobility of naval forces and their ability to operate
without the need for bases near the crisis area made them the instrument of
choice for crisis response. Even in the absence of a crisis, a forward U.S.
naval presence was perceived as having a stabilizing effect on less than stable
regimes.
• Sixth, the policy of forward deployment required the maintenance of a
network of bases worldwide to ensure that naval forces could resupply and be
repaired without traveling too far from the forward area of operations. (The
U.S. also maintained a number of additional foreign bases to accommodate
U.S. Army and Air Force combat and support units permanently stationed in
Western Europe and the Far East, as well as bases providing
communications and intelligence gathering functions.)
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• Seventh, the focus on East-West rivalry led to the development of intelligence
gathering organizations that focused on monitoring the East Bloc nations,
particularly the Soviet Union. 59
The containment paradigm produced U.S. naval forces that possessed high
endurance and a true "blue water" capability - good sea keeping and habitability
qualities. The U.S. Navy developed an advanced logistics capability that dwarfed
that of the Soviets or any other navy. The highly technical nature of U.S. naval
forces required sizable numbers of highly trained personnel who required
reasonable compensation to motivate them for continued membership in the All
Volunteer Force.
When one views the world through the new planning paradigm, the Soviet
Union is still present, but its threat potential is declining. Accordingly, the need to
bolster the resolve of allies by a direct U.S. military presence is less pressing.
However, other threats are present and stand to grow in importance as the future
unfolds.
When analyzed with regard to naval force requirements, the "New Threat"
possesses the following attributes. It consists of a variety of threats to America's
vital national interests - illegal drug trafficking, piracy, threats to U.S. citizens
abroad, the danger that American assets abroad will be nationalized, denial of
strategic resources and terrorism (including nuclear blackmail). These threats can
occur virtually anywhere throughout the world. Accordingly, America must
maintain the capability to project military force globally. Moreover, as many
59These seven points have been distilled from various articles concerning the Maritime
Strategy. For a comprehensive listing of works dealing with the Maritime Strategy', see
Peter M Swartz, CAPT, USN and Jan S. Breemer, The Maritime Strategy Debates: A Guide to the
Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic Thinking in the 1980s, Revised Kdition (Monterey, Ca.: Naval
Postgraduate School, 1989)
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Third World nations come to possess the capability to attack U.S. territory using
ballistic or cruise missiles, the need for U.S. armed forces, principally the Navy, to
maintain a capability to attack the foreign launch sites of these weapons will
become even more important.
The New Threat lacks the ability for central orchestration that the Soviet
threat possesses, meaning that threats requiring a U.S. military response are
likely to occur in serial fashion rather than simultaneously. Each threat will
therefore require a smaller scale military response than was the case with the
Soviet threat.
The New Threat is less predictable than the Soviet threat because more
governments are involved, which greatly increases the difficulty of accurate and
timely intelligence gathering, and many of these governments are less stable than
the Soviet government (despite the Soviet Union's current domestic difficulties).
Like the Soviet threat, the New Threat is high tech in nature. However, raid
density is likely to be far less than that expected during a Soviet attack.
Additionally, most Third World nations have limited stocks of high tech weapons.
Accordingly, an initial period of vulnerability from high tech weapons will be
followed by a period of greatly reduced threat level once the opponent has expended
his stockpile of smart weapons. The New Threat also lacks the refined capability
to interdict command, control, communications and intelligence gathering efforts
that the Soviets possess.
Like the Soviet threat, the New Threat is multidimensional: various Third
World nations possess advanced weapons for air, surface and subsurface warfare,
as well as advanced capabilities to attack ground forces. However, few Third
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World nations possess the advanced weapons and required expertise for conducting
high technology warfare in all dimensions simultaneously, and it is unlikely that
they will achieve this capability in the foreseeable future.
When the attributes of the New Threat are considered, one can see that a
navy designed to counter it must possess the following qualities:
• The Navy must be capable of global operations. U.S. naval forces must
therefore continue to be designed for high endurance. The need for
simultaneous operations throughout the globe is unlikely, indicating that the
size of the fleet can be reduced as Soviet naval capabilities decline. However,
the possibility of two or three simultaneous crises requiring the use of naval
forces cannot be ruled out. Also, while use of naval forces to combat the
Soviet threat required that the Navy possess a global warfighting capability,
that capability in fact was focused toward combat in the most likely theaters,
all of which possessed essentially temperate climates. Naval platforms were
optimized for duty in these regions. As a result, the Navy initially
encountered difficulty when called upon to operate in the dry, dusty, hot
conditions of the Persian Gulf. In the case of the New Threat, naval planners
must strive to make naval forces capable of operating in any climatic
condition on short notice. This is a tall order, especially if interpreted to
mean that all ships and aircraft must be able to operate in all climates at all
times. Perhaps a more realistic (and affordable) approach would be to refine
modular construction for different versions of equipment. This would make it
possible to replace entire banks of equipment optimized for one area of
operations with one that is configured for operations in another. This
approach is already being employed to make possible the speedy replacement
of large pieces of identical equipment, such as marine gas turbine engines.
Use of modularization to replace slightly different pieces of equipment should
be attainable.
• The need to gain and maintain sea control over large ocean areas will decline
as Soviet naval capabilities decline. However, the requirement to project
power ashore will remain essentially unchanged, and most crises involving
U.S. naval forces will occur in coastal areas rather than the open ocean. As
consensus among allies continues to erode (or even if it remains at its present
level) and U.S. access to foreign bases for national uses continues to decline,
the United States will conduct the preponderance of such operations
unilaterally and with lengthy supply lines. Under these conditions, naval
forces will need even higher endurance and versatility (e.g., enhanced anti-
mine warfare capability) than is now the case.
• The Navy must remain on the leading edge of high technology to deter and, if
necessary, defeat the New Threat. Accordingly, the Navy must maintain an
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extensive R&D effort to enable it to prevail in all dimensions of warfare.
However, the Navy must also refine its capabilities for countering "low tech"
warfare, such as the capability to engage small, high speed patrol boats and
slow flying aircraft at short ranges. Planners must also emphasize those
warfare capabilities that become relatively more important in coastal areas,
e.g. shallow water antisubmarine warfare and the ability to distinguish
targets from land background.
• Since the New Threat is more diffuse than the Soviet threat, intelligence
gathering efforts must become increasingly global in scope. As a related
issue, weapons systems must be designed to counter all likely threats instead
of focusing on the threat posed by Soviet systems.
• Since each individual crisis or threat will be of smaller scope than likely
scenarios involving the Soviet threat, smaller numbers of naval units should
be able to control a crisis situation. In cases of low expected raid density, the
presence of a complete carrier battle group will be unnecessary as long as the
technology possessed by the units on station is sufficiently high, and the
weapons systems of units are sufficiently redundant.
• Foreign bases will still be necessary to deal with the New Threat, but they
can be greatly reduced in number. First, the requirement for foreign
communications stations and intelligence gathering posts has steadily
declined as technology has advanced. Moreover, a diminished Soviet threat
will lower the need for redundant systems in these areas (HF
communications and ground based listening posts). Second, the need to
maintain foreign bases whose primary purpose is to garrison U.S. combat
troops will continue to fall as the Soviet threat declines. The Navy will need
to retain a worldwide network of bases for logistics purposes and to provide a
ship repair facility within reasonable range of each likely theater of
operations. As a minimum, the following foreign bases should be retained:
• Diego Garcia (for Indian Ocean, East Africa, Southwest Asia and Persian
Gulf).
• Azores (for South and Central Atlantic Ocean, West Africa, and
transshipment to Western Europe, Mediterranean Sea and Middle East,
including the Persian Gulf).
• Sicily (for Mediterranean Sea and transshipment to Middle East,
including Persian Gulf).
• Iceland (for North Atlantic Ocean and Norwegian Sea, and
transshipment to Western Europe).
• South China Sea area, currently performed by bases in the Philippines
(Western Pacific Ocean, East and Southeast Asia, Australia, and
transshipment to Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf).
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• As the need to bolster the ability of U.S. allies to resist Soviet encroachment
subsides, the need for continuous forward presence will decline. The New
Threat will require that the U.S. Navy provide a periodic presence
throughout the world's oceans and maintain the demonstrated ability to
respond quickly anywhere in the world with sufficient force to defend
American interests. The continuing existence of unstable regions containing
vital American interests will require temporary concentrations of U.S. naval
forces in time of crisis, and the need to retain operating proficiency and "show
the flag" for purposes of increasing America's prestige abroad will make
frequent out of area operations desirable.
Table 1 summarizes the differences - and similarities - between desired
operational capabilities of navies designed based on threat analyses conducted
using the containment paradigm on the one hand and the new paradigm that
focuses on protection of America's vital interests on the other.
TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS UNDER
THE CONTAINMENT PARADIGM AND THE NEW PARADIGM
Containment Paradigm New Paradigm
LARGE NAVY MODERATELY SIZED NAVY
SEA CONTROL OVER LARGE
AREAS, SLOC PROTECTION
NECESSARY







HIGH ENDURANCE HIGH ENDURANCE
CONDUCT WORLDWIDE
SIMULTANEOUS OPS
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HIGH TECH, ALL DIMENSIONS, HIGH TECH, ALL
DIMENSIONS
HIGH DENSITY RAIDS FOR
SUSTAINED TIMEFRAME
















ON SOVIET UNION AND EAST BLOC
INTELLIGENCE EFFORT
WORLDWIDE IN SCOPE





C. REQUIRED STAFF SUPPORT FUNCTIONS FOR EACH PARADIGM
Just as the containment paradigm strongly affected naval force capabilities,
it also influenced the organizational structure of the Navy. In general, while the
basic thrust of the Navy's organizational structure must be to fight and win in war
regardless of the planning paradigm employed, the adoption of the new paradigm
based on protection of American interests in a world of increasingly diffuse threats
places greater importance on the proper performance and optimization of certain
staff functions.
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As previously mentioned, intelligence gathering requirements will diversify
in the foreseeable future. Since the Soviet Union will continue to constitute the
only threat to the existence of the United States, intelligence organizations will
have to maintain a high level of monitoring of that nation's activities. However, as
the New Threat develops,the need to monitor and analyze the activities of other
nations will constantly grow. Intelligence organizations will have to adjust and
augment their personnel structures accordingly. Additionally, the scope of
National Technical Means (NTM) will have to be expanded.
Arms control is another area that has become of importance to defense
planners. In general, as the level of weapons held by the superpowers declines,
certain concerns arise:
• A given level of cheating by one party has more serious consequences for the
others since, with smaller arsenals, it represents a relatively larger increase
in military power. The Soviets have a rich history of cheating on arms control
agreements, and the United States has been unable to find an effective form
of sanction to curtail Soviet cheating. 60
• Arms control by the superpowers limits their capabilities while leaving the
capabilities of other nations unaffected.
• Geographic asymmetries may actually make equal cuts by both superpowers
distinctly disadvantageous to one side.
• Considerable public and elite opinion exists in the West that postulates that
any arms control is good by and of itself.
Naval forces have thus far been exempted from arms control negotiations ( with the
exception of Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)), but a review of the
SORonald Reagan, The President's Unclassified Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms
Control Agreements, 2 December 1988. See also
Edward J Epstein, "Disinformation: or, Why The CIA Cannot Verify An Arms Control
Agreement." Commentary, 74, 1 (July 1982): 21-28
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controversy over limiting Sea Launched Cruise Missiles (SLCMs) serves to
underscore the degree of effort being expended by the Soviets and many Americans
to include various naval weapons and platforms in arms control negotiations. 61
Admiral Trost, Chief of Naval Operations, recently indicated that arms control
concerns were at the top of his agenda62 .
The Navy needs to develop a cadre of officers skilled in arms control issues
and negotiations, including skill in dealing with the other armed services, the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and other appropriate agencies in the
Executive branch. In addition to interagency relationships, the Navy should
develop a group of officers skilled in communicating with the Congress. This group
will become increasingly valuable as fiscal constraints increase pressures to slash
future defense budgets.
As foreigners see U.S. naval units less frequently under a policy of periodic
forward presence, the importance of Naval and Marine Corps officers stationed
overseas will grow since they will have a relatively greater opportunity to shape
the opinion of foreign elites toward United States foreign policies, particularly
those utilizing U.S. military forces. While the Navy maintains an inventory of
trained Area Specialists, it does not use them in a recurring, methodical manner.63
(il For a discussion of the pros and cons for controlling SLCMs, see
Henry C Mustin, "The Sea Launched Cruise Missile: More Than a Bargaining Chip" International
Security, 13, 3 (Winter 1988/89): 184-190. See also
William H. Manthorpe, Jr. "Why Is Gorbachev Pushing Naval Arms Control?" U.S. Naval Institute
Proceedings (January 1989): 73-76.
62Carlisle AH. Trost, Admiral, USN, Chief of Naval Operations. Statement before the Senate
Armed Services Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, 11 May 1990, 4-5. See
also
Carlisle All. Trost, Admiral, USN, Chief of Naval Operations. Address at the Sea - Air - Space
Symposium, 1 1 April 1990, 1-6
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The Navy should use this cadre of officers skilled in foreign relations and the
history, traditions, language and culture of various foreign nations, and use them
on a recurring basis to foster ties of mutual cooperation with foreign armed forces.
Lastly, the diffuse nature of the New Threat increases the difficulty of Navy
strategic planning. In a sense, planners are deprived of the singleness of purpose
that was lent by the containment paradigm. Adoption of the new paradigm will
require greater flexibility from strategic planners, who will need to continuously
adjust plans as the relative probability of threats and the possession of new
technology by various regimes rapidly changes the most likely employment of
naval forces. In general, analysts and planners will have to deal with more
variables in arriving at recommendations and courses of action for naval force
structure and employment. As in the case of the Legislative Affairs Program
63For a discussion of the ways that the different U.S. armed services manage their Area
Specialist Programs, see
Randy P. Burkett, CAPT, USAF, "The Training and Employment of Area Specialists in the
Military" (Masters Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, Ca,June 1989).
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mentioned earlier, strong indication exists that the Navy's leadership realizes
these facts and is taking steps to enhance Navy Strategic Planning.^4
D. RECOMMENDATIONS
The most interesting observation concerning the required capabilities and
support organizations of a navy designed to the new planning paradigm is that the
number of similarities with the "old" requirements outweighs disparities. This
implies that change from use of the old paradigm to the new one will be
evolutionary rather than revolutionary and, therefore, much more manageable
than might appear on the surface. Yet, despite these resemblances, important
differences do exist. They point to a need to readjust both force structure and staff
organization in certain ways.
First, the size of the Navy should decline as Soviet capabilities and intentions
decrease. Cuts should be made in certain areas while other areas should be
64For information regarding recent initiatives to formalize and enhance the Navy's strategic-
planning programs, see the following references:
Carlisle A.H. Trost, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations. Memorandum for the
Executive Director, CNO Executive Panel (OP-00K): Task Force on Navy Strategy Formation, 26
January 1989.
Charles R Larson, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy and
Operations). Memorandum from the DCNO (Plans, Policy and Operations): Developing Navy
Strategic Thinkers, 14 February 1989
E.R Diamond, Jr., Captain, U.S. Navy Memorandum for the Head, National Policy and Command
Organization Branch. 1989 POL MIL Subspecialty Selection Board, 28 JULY 1989.
LA. Edney, VADM, U.S. Navy, Vice Chief Of Naval Operations. OPNAV INSTRUCTION 1524.1
of 1 8 October 1989: OP-06 Chair of Strategic Planning at the Naval Postgraduate School.
Carlisle AH. Trost, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations. Memorandum for the Deputy
Chief of Naval Operations, Plans, Policy and Operations (OP-06): Navy Strategic Formation Task
Force, 8 January 1990
R.J. Kelly, VADM, U.S. Navy, Deputy Chief of Naval operations (Plans, Policy and Operations).
Memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations: Navy Strategy Formation Task Force, 6 March
1990
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expanded to enhance the Navy's capability to deal with the New Threat. The Navy
should increase the number of auxiliary ships to improve the fleet's endurance for
conducting distant operations and should reassess the feasibility of Combined
Nuclear and Gas Turbine Propulsion (CONAG) for both combatant and auxiliary
ships to further improve endurance as well as speed capability. More amphibious
ships should be procured to provide an enhanced amphibious warfare capability to
deal with the continuing need for power projection operations. Specifically,
amphibious warfare platforms will need to possess increased self-defense
capabilities to counteract the increasingly high tech weapons of adversaries. The
maximum speed of new classes of amphibious ships should be increased to enable
them to achieve greater surprise and to minimize their period of greatest
vulnerability close to shore. Special warfare forces should also be refined and
augmented to provide a capability to attack inland targets on a small scale, such as
would be required to destroy a ballistic missile production facility or a nuclear
weapons manufacturing plant without using aircraft. On the other hand, the
numbers of combatant vessels - aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates and
submarines - should be reduced, beginning with the elimination of older platforms
that have difficulty operating independently because they lack modern high tech
systems.
The number of aircraft carriers to be retained, by far the most sensitive issue
because of the national prestige associated with them, must be a function of the
number of crises against which the national leadership wishes to apply naval
forces simultaneously. A "four to one" thumb rule is useful in assessing this
requirement: under normal circumstances, for every carrier on station in some
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trouble spot, there is another in a shipyard undergoing some form of overhaul,
another undergoing predeployment preparations and another in an
interdeployment inspection and training cycle. Thus, if the national leadership
determines that U.S. naval forces must be able to react to three crises
simultaneously and use carrier battle groups to do so, then roughly 12 carriers are
required. The carriers in the interdeployment phase of their operating cycles can
be pressed into service for crisis response operations, but only for short periods
unless the leadership is willing to incur personnel dissatisfaction and equipment
deterioration in those units. Therefore, to respond to three crises simultaneously
with a fleet composed of less than 12 carriers means that the Navy either stresses
the carriers beyond normal limits or opts to employ more battle groups without a
carrier. If the threat from airborne opposition is low, the battle group can be
organized around a battleship or a cruiser, or, if the mission principally involves a
maritime blockade of some sort, submarines can be used. Another possible way to
conserve carrier assets involves a combination of both approaches. A carrier battle
group is employed until the air threat has been attenuated, then the carrier is
replaced by a cruiser or battleship, or the entire battle group by a submarine
blockading force, which could be quite small but command considerable respect
from the opponent. 65 The ability of surface combatants and submarines to
substitute for aircraft carriers in certain circumstances makes the idea of building
"small deck" carriers inappropriate. The Navy should continue to build large deck
65For a discussion on the use of the submarine in this and related roles, see
Brent Alan Uitzler, LT, USN, "Naval Diplomacy Beneath the Waves: A Study of the Coercive Use




carriers to deal with crises possessing a significant airborne threat or requiring air
strikes ashore that cannot be accomplished by cruise missile strikes alone.
The need for the Navy to remain the leader in high technology applications
for naval warfare means that a vigorous R&D effort must continue. In addition to
R&D, new and upgraded systems must actually be introduced to the fleet, for it is
only by extended use in an operational environment that the performance of a new
system can be thoroughly proven. With smaller numbers of combatant ships and
aircraft in the fleet, unit costs of each new system will go up, but overall costs
should decrease. The actual production of new systems also serves to maintain the
ability of American industry to produce high technology weapons systems.
Along similar lines, the Navy must continue to buy new ships, submarines
and aircraft, even though the fleet will be smaller, in order to preserve American
industry's naval shipbuilding capability and, in general, to keep the U.S.
industrial base "warm" with regard to the industrial capabilities needed to
maintain naval forces. For example, if the Navy discontinues construction of
NIMITZ class aircraft carriers without starting construction of a follow-on class, it
is likely that Newport News Shipbuilding and Drydocking Company, the only
company in the world capable of building large deck aircraft carriers, will lose the
ability to do so because the company will be unable to continue to employ their
specialized work force. In time of need, another contractor could be found, but the
costs would be extremely high and the startup time prohibitively long. Similar
situations exist in the limited number of shipyards engaged in naval construction,
66
as well as with many large defense contractors.66 Accordingly, the Navy should
use this period while the New Threat is emerging to develop a smaller but more
modern fleet, and, most importantly, one that can grow without excessive delay
when another, more ominous threat develops.
Research and development into various "exotic" technologies must continue
in order to maximize the probability that the United States will be the first nation
to achieve a breakthrough in weapons technology -- directed energy weapons,
nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare, stealth applications to surface ships and
aircraft. Similarly, the U.S. must maintain and extend its lead in C3I capability
even though the New Threat possesses little ability to disrupt it. Once forfeited,
such leadership will be hard to regain, and it is imprudent to assume that a new,
high technology threat will not emerge in the future. Until the emergence of such
a threat becomes more clear, actual deployment of new C3I systems can be limited
to that necessary to prove their effectiveness, but, again, such a course of action
preserves American capability to expand deployment of high technology systems
when required in the future. As the existence of a smaller fleet that maintains a
periodic forward presence develops, operating costs will decline, and some of these
funds should be diverted into R&D in these areas.
In the area of personnel organization, intelligence gathering organizations
should be expanded. Much of the additional monitoring required by the New
Threat can be spread over the various armed service and national intelligence
66For an historical precedent to this phenomemon, see
G.A.H. Gordon, British Seapower and Procurement Between the Wars; A Reappraisal of
Rearmament (Annapolis, Md : Naval Institute Press, 1988), 76-95. See also
Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: The
Asfield Press, 1988), 287.
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gathering organizations. An expansion of National Technical Means (NTM) may
prove to be the most cost effective way of achieving additional monitoring
coverage. Such an approach would aid in the continued development of high
technology systems as well. Intelligence organizations should continue to refine
analysis capabilities; to this end, organizations should continuously refine the
application of machine assisted analysis or cybernetic models. 67
Changes in career management for strategic planners, international
negotiators, legislative affairs subspecialists and area specialists can be performed
at little or no cost to the Navy.
Adoption of the new paradigm for naval strategic planning actually
multiplies the power of existing forces. Utilizing only periodic forward operations
frees U.S. naval forces from many forward deployed commitments, enabling the
U.S. Navy to bring what Edward Luttwak calls "greater than proportional force"
to bear when required. Luttwak uses the strategy of imperial Rome to explain this
concept:
... the Roman Army, which the clients perceived as an undivided force of
overwhelming strength, was actually distributed in major concentrations in a
vast irregular circle around Rome. But it was not a thin, perimeter
distribution. The troops were concentrated in multilegion armies: they were
not committed to territorial defense and were thus inherently mobile and
freely redeployable. There was no central field force held in reserve, but the
flexibility of the deployment was such that almost half the army could be
engaged in fighting rebellion in a single province without compromising the
security of the rest of the Empire.68
67See Albert Clarkson, Toward Effective Strategic Analysis: New Applications of Information
Technology (Boulder, Co.: Westview Press, Westview Special Studies in National Security and
Defense Policy, 1981)
68Edward N Luttwak, The Grand Strutegy of the Roman Empire (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 19761,73
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While modern intelligence networks make it unlikely that the U.S. Navy will be
regarded as quite the overwhelming force that Rome's clients perceived the legions
to be, the U. S. Navy's ability to concentrate force, always more present in naval
forces than in ground forces, will increase more than proportionately as it
discontinues its continuous presence in certain ocean areas where the threat is
actually quite low.
Alternatively, an examination of the British Empire in its later days
demonstrates how adherence to a policy of continuous naval presence in many
areas of the world resulted in a Royal Navy that was essentially strategically
overextended, i.e., a Navy that could only station a few ships in each area of
interest. As other nations developed modern navies of their own, a situation
analogous in some ways to the present situation in which many Third World
nations are acquiring modern weapons, the Royal Navy found itself outgunned on
almost every station despite the large size of its fleet.69
A planned reduction in fleet size will strengthen the United States' position
against entry into naval arms control talks. A case can be made that bilateral
arms control measures are unnecessary since America is already reducing its
naval forces. An American declaration that containment has been supplanted by a
policy that seeks to protect America's vital national interests, and that naval force
planning is now guided by this new paradigm, would further strengthen the
position that naval arms control is unnecessary.
«9Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Full of British Naval Mastery (Atlantic Highlands, N.J : Tht
Asfield Press, 1988), 206-208
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The foregoing comments contain many recommendations that involve
additional funding in certain areas. As Chapter Five will show, the chances of
obtaining additional funding over current levels for the Navy is extremely remote,
regardless of how irrefutable the reasoning and justifications involved. In another
vein, the thought of reducing the size of the fleet and reapportioning the mix of
ship types, submarines and aircraft is repugnant to many in the naval
establishment. However, as the Soviet threat declines and the New Threat
continues to develop, the new planning paradigm indicates that fleet size can
shrink without endangering national security. Indeed, attempts to maintain a
large fleet in the face of domestic constraints are doomed to failure and will leave
the United States with naval forces incapable of properly serving the national
interest.
As the fleet is reduced, operating costs, including personnel costs, will
decrease. Navy strategic planners, along with financial analysts, must formulate
a plan for protecting America's vital interests against the New Threat that is so
workable and well justified that the Navy's leadership can convince their superiors
and the Congress to reallocate some of the cost savings provided by the smaller
fleet (and possibly some savings from reductions in the other armed services) to
other areas of naval force development.
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V. DOMESTIC FACTORS CONSTRAINING DEVELOPMENT OF THE
REQUIRED NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE
A. INTRODUCTION
A number of domestic political, economic and social trends promise to
constrain the attainment of the desired naval force structure. As constraints
mount, a sound strategy with a clear formulation of force requirements becomes
essential.
While this analysis tends to view these trends as constraints upon achieving
effective naval force and organizational structures, their potential ramifications
are much broader in scope and pose serious challenges to America's continued role
as a superpower. In dealing with them, policy makers are certain to become
increasingly preoccupied with domestic concerns at the expense of foreign affairs
(including defense requirements). Such a process has already occurred in the
Soviet Union; it is not inconceivable that a similar phenomenon will occur in the
United States, especially given its traditional isolationist tendencies. American
policy makers must overcome these domestic problems while retaining sufficient
military forces to enable the United States to remain the major actor on the world
stage, a task that may constitute the greatest challenge facing America in the next
decade.
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B. CONGRESS' DILEMMA: HOW TO REDUCE THE DEFICIT
Basically stated, Congress is caught between the expectations of their
constituents and the reality of a tax base that is insufficient to pay for the services
which they demand.
The federal budget is composed of four broad categories: entitlements (which
include health care expenditures), defense, interest on the debt, and "everything
else." "Everything else" is already small compared to the other categories, and
interest must continue to be paid on the debt to preserve the good faith of the
government and the stability of the economic system. Defense and entitlements
compete for the remainder of the revenue.70
By the year 2010, the U.S. government expects to expend 33% of its budget
for care of the elderly. This number is expected to rise to 45% by 2030 if present
federally subsidized health care programs remain intact. The lion's share of health
care outlays will be for care of the very old. 71 Such a situation would leave a
shortage of funds for other important programs such as defense. In addition, public
demands for improvement in the quality of education, for infrastructure renewal,
and for cleanup of the environment will continue to grow and compete for a share of
the budget.
The tax base from which the government obtains revenue will consist, as
now, primarily of individuals and businesses. However, since the number of
elderly (those aged 65 or greater) will rise from the present 12% of the population
7uRobert S Wood, Strategic Choices, Geopolitics, and Resource Constraints, presented 2
December 1988 at a symposium on "The National Security Process: The Making of National
Strategy for the 1990's and Beyond" (Washington, DC: National Defense University), 14 16.
71 Lee Smith, "What Do We Owe the Elderly?" Fortune (27 March 1989): 54-55.
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to 18% by the year 202072, the American work force will consist of a relatively
smaller number of younger workers who are likely to be paying a substantially
increased FICA tax to subsidize the Social Security system?3 and will therefore be
likely to resist further increases in income or ad valorem taxes. In the case of
raising corporate and other business income taxes, concern exists over whether
business productivity can rise sufficiently to handle a greatly increased tax burden
without serious harm to profitability and capital investment.
Despite these problems, it is likely that demands for increased entitlements
will continue. In recent years, many special interest groups, such as the American
Association of Retired Persons (AARP), have come to wield considerable influence
with the Congress and promise to become even more powerful in the future as their
ranks grow. The platforms of these groups are strongly influenced by the fact that
Americans as a group have become conditioned to expect an ever increasing
standard of living, part of which is composed of an increasing government
subsidized social welfare benefits package that includes provisions for a pleasant
and secure retirement. (Studies indicate that only slightly more than one in five
mbid.,54.
73ln 1984, greater than 60% of eligible persons relied on Social Security benefits for greater
than 50% of their income, even though the maximum annual Social Security benefit was limited to
$10,416. In fact, the average annual income from all sources for persons aged 65 or greater was
$10,170 Even though Social Security benefits provide only a modest source of income, a large
number of retired Americans depend on these payments As the number of elderly increases both
in absolute terms and relative to the number of working age Americans, it will be difficult for the
administrators of the Social Security Fund to maintain the current outlay levels, indexed for
inflation, without raising the FICA tax to intolerable levels. For additional information, see
Martynas A. Yeas and Susan Grad, "Income of Retired Aged Persons in the United States," Social
Security Bulletin 50, 7 (Julv 1987): 7-9.
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retired persons opt to work on some basis following retirement despite their
relatively low group median income.74)
Congress is thus under strong pressure to maintain and enhance
entitlements even though the federal budget deficit continues to rise. Pressure
also exists to increase funding for much needed programs to fight drugs, cleanup
the environment, improve the nation's aging infrastructure, and improve the
quality of education.
Under such conditions, strong pressure will exist to cut defense spending, the
only remaining area of the budget that is not sacrosanct. Additionally, the
continued vitality of America's economic system will be endangered unless the
government produces a workable plan for reducing the federal budget deficit.
Such action is necessary to preserve the confidence of foreign investors, who
currently finance a substantial portion of the deficit. Failure to demonstrate an
ability to reduce the deficit will eventually lead to a rise in interest rates as foreign
and domestic investors start to demand higher returns on the government
securities used to finance it. This would cause a general rise in the cost of capital
for private firms and would reduce capital investment both in new equipment and
in research and development needed to keep American industry competitive.
Higher tax rates would compound this effect. Since the American economy's
comparative advantage lies in the research intensive high technology sector, the
availability of sufficient investment funds is even more essential. Moreover,
America's armed forces rely on high technology weapons to give them a
™Ibid.,5.
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competitive edge against its potential adversaries. In their absence, the military
superiority of the United States could be greatly diminished.
The problem with the federal budget deficit is still manageable, but it will
not remain so indefinitely.
The budget deficit is twice as large as it ever was in the Ford or Carter years.
Yet the U.S. economy has grown so much that as a percentage of GNP, the
deficit is roughly equivalent to the 2.8% in Mr. Carter's last year, and it is half
the 1983 peak. A nation, like an individual, can afford more debt if its wealth
is growing. 7 5
The United States can reduce the deficit by a combination of two processes. First,
the government must reduce federal spending in relative terms and arrive at a
balanced budget to begin reducing the deficit. Second, policies to encourage
economic growth must be pursued, since a larger economy provides a larger tax
base.
Based on the expectations of the American people discussed above, and the
belief that the deficit is still very manageable, balancing the budget will be
extremely difficult. Congress will tend to evade the hard issue of reducing
entitlements for fear of incurring the resistance of their constituents and of various
special interest groups. This evasion will continue as long as funds can be
siphoned from other areas of the budget. Under such conditions, significant
defense cuts will occur until the American people become convinced that further
cuts endanger national security. The ability to convince the American people of
the need for armed forces of a certain size and structure is an essential ingredient
75Karen Elliott House, "For All Its Difficulties, U.S. Stands to Retain Its Global Leadership,"
The Wall Street Journal, 23 January 1989
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for preserving forces adequate to counter the New Threat. A well-supported
strategic doctrine, of which naval force planning is a significant component, forms
the cornerstone of this ability.
C. NATIONAL ECONOMIC CONCERNS
In addition to the effects that higher taxes and federal budgetary problems
pose for the economy, U.S. policy makers must contend with structural problems in
the economy itself. The increasing economic rivalry among the United States, the
other industrialized nations and with many other emerging nations with strong
economies is cause for concern. Over the last two decades, America's lead in world
economic dominance has eroded. The war devastated economies of Europe and
Japan have revitalized (events that could be expected). Additionally, a number of
Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC's) such as Korea, Taiwan and Singapore
continue to capture a growing market share in a number of traditionally American
dominated industries such as steel, textiles and automobiles. The United States
has developed chronic trade deficits with many of these nations.'76 To add to this
picture, the vast, largely untapped economic potential of China lurks in the wings,
as does the considerable economic might of the Soviet Union should that country be
able to correct the gross inefficiencies of her centralized economy. This trend bears
directly on America's ability to remain foremost among nations. While the sheer
size of America's territory, population and resource base virtually guarantee its
76Paul Magnusson, "Will We Ever Close the Trade Gap 7 " Business Week (27 February 1989)
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continued role as one of the world's largest economic powers?7
,
these factors do not
automatically promise that it will remain first among nations or that its people's
standard of living will continue to increase.
To preserve America's share of world markets, policy makers must examine
both domestic and foreign policies. As mentioned above, Washington must show
the world that a plan exists to end the deficit spending of the last decade. Next,
American policy makers must encourage a strong economy through the following
steps:
• encourage free trade. American negotiators must press for the easing of
restrictions on international trade in services and agricultural products, two
of America's strong points.
• institute greater safeguards for intellectual property rights. If absent,
America's lead in innovation and the imaginative use of high technology can
be compromised.
• improve the effectiveness of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) for dealing with non-tariff trade barriers.
• encourage the development of domestic industries in which America
possesses a comparative advantage and stop protection of non-competitive
industries.
The main challenge to the first three proposals will come from Third World
nations, including many Newly Industrialized Countries (NIC's) such as Brazil
and Mexico, that have relied excessively on protectionist measures to foster the
development of domestic industries. These countries must be convinced that their
policies have failed. The examples set by Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Hong
Kong - all free traders - should aid in this effort. Domestically, the government
77 Paul Kennedy, The Rise unci Full of The Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987.
Vintage Books, 1989), 533
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must minimize its own protectionist policies. It must encourage the development
of industries for which America has a comparative advantage, generally high
technology and service industries^, and must not protect industries that are
inefficient or noncompetitive internationally. The decline of manufacturing in the
United States appears to be a natural step in the evolution to a "post-industrial"
society. It is not a trend to be feared by and of itself.79 However, national security
considerations dictate that some manufacturing capabilities must be protected to
ensure sufficient productive capacities in vital areas should war occur. Since the
lengthy procurement times for modern weapons place heavy emphasis on the
forces in existence at the initiation of war, a smaller list of protected industries is
needed than in the past. As a minimum, the government should protect industries
that provide U.S. armed forces with some important, unique capability - nuclear
powered aircraft carriers and submarines, advanced aircraft, smart weapons. The
funds freed up from propping up nonessential, non-competitive industries can be
used to retrain and relocate Americans whose jobs have become obsolete. Later,
policy makers can apply these funds to subsidize research and development in the
high technology sector.
I). CONCERNS WITH THE AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM
The maintenance of a leadership position in high technology requires a
sizable cadre of imaginative scientists, engineers and managers who feel at home
?8Michael F Bryan, "lb Manufacturing Disappearing?" Economic Commentary, Federal
Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 15 July 1985 (ISSN 0428-1276): 1.
79Patricia F Beeson and Michael F. Bryan, "The Emerging Service Economy, "Economic
Commentary, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 15 June 1986 (ISSN 0428 1276): 1
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with high technology and with coordinating the activities of a highly intelligent
and mature work force to develop new products. Additionally, the individuals who
operate and repair high tech systems often must possess considerable knowledge
concerning the theoretical principles underlying their equipment's performance.
Moreover, the rate of advances in high technology continues to accelerate, making
the maintenance of proficiency a challenge for all concerned.
High quality education is the cornerstone upon which continued leadership
in the design and application of high technology systems lies. In rapidly changing
fields, education must become a continuous process. It must continue to train
persons for employment in the high technology sector, and must keep current
workers up to date on new developments. All levels of education come into play. If
primary education is deficient, then high school students fail to gain the
knowledge for entry into college.
Quality education is expensive, and many look to the federal government
once again to subsidize education in various ways. On the local level, citizens
often respond negatively to requests to increase property taxes to enhance
revenues for local schools. In an austere federal budgetary climate, increased
funding for education will be difficult to obtain. In the long run, choices made now
in the area of funding for education, as well as decisions regarding educational
reform, will have ramifications well into the next century and will be a central
influence on whether the United States will retain its leadership in high
technology innovation.
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E. AMERICAN VIEWS TOWARD THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE
Planners must remember certain basic attitudes of the American people
when designing the structure of naval forces. Some of these attitudes reflect
traditional American views toward war. Others are the result of recent history,
most notably the Vietnam War.
A nation's ideologies influence its perceptions of which foreign policy
objectives are worth expending the lives of some of its citizens in uniform. Many
ideologies are present in the United States. They interact, sometimes
complementing each other, at other times competing for dominance. Ideologies
derive from political, social and religious sources.
Nationalism and capitalism are the principal ideologies in the United States
today. Their aggressive elements are tempered by the American tradition of
isolationism and by an adherence to the beliefs of the "liberal conscience" of the
western democracies. A tendency toward isolationism persists in much of the
public and is attributable to the feeling of security from external invasion (nuclear
war notwithstanding) afforded by America's insular geographical position^.
Subscription to the tenets of the liberal conscience, which Michael Howard, author
of War and the Liberal Conscience, describes as a belief that the world can and
should be changed to enable each man to more fully realize his potential^ 1 , inclines
Americans to emphasize the value of human life and of the individual man. An
80Robert S.Wood, Strategic Choices, Geopolitics, and Resource Constraints, presented 2
December 1988 at a symposium on "The National Security Process: The Making of National
Strategy for the 1990's and Beyond," (Washington, DC, National Defense University), 1-3.
81 Michael Howard, War and the Liberal Conscience (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University
Press, 1986), 11.
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abhorrence of war and a desire to view reality through a Utopian lens flows from
such a position.
As heirs to the liberal conscience, Americans are reluctant to resort to
violence in foreign affairs unless vital national interests are clearly threatened.
Americans find limited wars problematical, and they have difficulty rationalizing
that significant numbers of American servicemen must die for a limited goal when
their own security is not threatened. The liberal conscience compounds the
dilemma by insinuating that the use of force to aid an oppressed people is "good" by
and of itself.
Accordingly, policy makers should reserve the use of force for situations
which enjoy the clear support of the American people. This support will only arise
from a situation in which American interests are clearly endangered. Economic
constraints dictate that military action of any but the smallest scope will require
the indirect but explicit participation of the American people through increased
taxes, a situation likely to be unpopular for reasons already discussed unless
America itself is threatened.
F. RECOMMENDATIONS
Defense planners must be thoroughly familiar with national trends and
constraints in the present day United States, since the domestic political and social
climate directly affect planners' ability to successfully counter likely threats by
limiting funding levels and, therefore, force structure. These trends indicate that
naval planners will to be working in an environment characterized by:
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• shrinking defense budgets.
• the preoccupation of legislators and many members of the Executive branch
of government with non-defense issues, almost all of which will have strong,
politically active advocates and require large amounts of funding.
• a perception that the overall threat to the United States has been virtually
eliminated by the economic problems in the Soviet Union. The public will
have difficulty appreciating the varied nature of emerging threats, and even
more difficulty envisioning how these factors affect America's national
security. Accordingly, the natural reluctance of Americans to use military
force abroad will be heightened.
In this environment, planners must accurately define the threat and propose
a strategy, including the structure of naval forces, to deal with it. They must
convince their leadership to actively market their perception of the threat in order
to continue to garner the necessary share of the budget. The armed service that
fails to sell its product well stands to lose funding, regardless of the threat that it
must counteract. Additionally, naval forces must to be capable of quickly
achieving tactical dominance over an area of operations so that the conflict can be
rapidly settled, with minimum U.S. casualties, in favor of the United States.
Lastly, leadership must provide stable career management and reasonable pay for
armed forces personnel to enable each service to compete favorably with the other
users of persons trained in high technology systems, designs and applications.
It is important to note that all of the above recommendations focus on the
quality of the armed forces in being. All can be implemented despite anticipated
tight budgetary conditions. In fact, they must be implemented if America's armed
forces, and the Navy in particular, are to remain an effective tool of national
policy.
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VI. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS
As the 1990s unfold, new challenges to the national interests of the United
States will evolve. The Soviet threat, long the focal point of American strategic
planning, is subsiding and, if present trends continue, will pose a steadily
diminishing threat to the United States for the remainder of the decade and
beyond. At best, the potentially liberalizing effects of Perestroika and Glasnost
will moderate the Soviet Union's traditionally aggressive and expansionist
behavior in the international arena and make it a more cooperative member of the
world body of nations. At worst, the failure of Mikhail Gorbachev's economic
reforms will result in his replacement by a hard line, Stalinist type regime that
uses the threat of an aggressive Western world to refocus the attention of the
Soviet people away from their own country's severe domestic problems. In reality,
a situation somewhere between these two extremes most probably will
predominate for the near to midterm;the Soviet Union will continue to practice a
moderate, conciliatory foreign policy to conserve its national assets and to
maximize its chances of gaining Western help in reinvigorating its economy. If a
Stalinist regime does arise, the state of the Soviet economy will restrict its ability
for large scale, sustained military power projection unless the Soviet people can be
subjugated and harnessed for a war economy. Even then, the Soviet Union will
remain unable to feed its people without Western cooperation, making the
initiation of a large scale war of aggression highly risky. The continued
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maintenance of a credible U. S. nuclear deterrent will also serve as a brake on such
plans.
While these changes are transpiring in the Soviet Union, no other military
threat approaching Soviet proportions is developing in the near to midterm. While
an analysis of alternative future scenarios shows that the world is moving toward
an increasingly multipolar balance of power system, the new emerging great
powers are either presently aligned with the United States (Western Europe,
Japan) or trail the United States and the other advanced nations by a considerable
margin in GNP, military power, and most other indicators of power (India, China,
Brazil).
American defense planners must resist the tendency to continue to focus on
the Soviet threat after it has ceased to pose the most probable danger to American
national interests. Other threats already exist and the danger that these new,
evolving threats pose to U.S. national interests is likely to increase over the next
several years. A failure on the part of America's leadership and strategic planners
to realize this fact will result in an inability to respond to many crises with
appropriately tailored military force, which will reduce U.S. policy options for
dealing with them and result in a reduction in U.S. influence and prestige
throughout the world. If military force is used despite inappropriate capabilities,
excessive loss of American lives may result and the operation may fail. The
American public would be unforgiving of the military in such a situation.
Moreover, the likelihood of austere defense budgets for the foreseeable future will
make it extremely difficult for defense planners to redesign existing forces that
were based on poorly conceived and prioritized threat analyses.
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Planners must remember that military threats form only one part of the
planning equation. Changes in political and economic factors will accompany
military developments such as the proliferation of ballistic missiles, sea launched
cruise missiles, nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and other "smart" weapons.
One cannot rule out the possibility that this combination of factors will conspire to
increase the likelihood that many Third World leaders will resort to military force
to settle differences. As a super power with global interests, it is certain that these
trends will ultimately result in threats to vital U. S. national interests. Some
crises undoubtedly will require the use of American military forces to counteract.
Most will have little or no relation to the traditional East-West rivalry and, in its
absence, the positions taken on each crisis by the United States and its allies are
increasingly likely to diverge. Accordingly, while policy makers should continue
to encourage strong alliance systems that benefit the United States, strategic
planners must plan to deal with crises using U.S. military assets exclusively.
Assuming that America wishes to remain the leading world power, i.e. to
become the fulcrum actor as the world moves toward a multipolar balance of
power system, accurate and timely strategic planning has never been more vital.
As the branch of America's armed forces most often called upon to respond to crises
and likely to remain so in the future, the U. S. Navy must be proactive in designing
a force capable of surmounting these new threats. The nearterm decisions of Navy
strategic planners are particularly important in this regard.
To succeed at this difficult task, defense planners must adopt a new paradigm
that stresses protection of America's vital national interests rather than clinging
to the traditional one, which focuses on containing the Soviet Union. The latter
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approach was effective when the Soviet Union posed the major threat to American
interests and when the Third World possessed negligible military power. As the
New Threat emerges, retention of the containment paradigm will result in a U.S.
military force structure that is optimized for a scenario that is becoming less and
less probable. This increasing divergence between force structure and anticipated
force mission will become more important as the evolution of the New Threat
produces technologically sophisticated Third World military forces around the
globe. Adoption of the new paradigm will foster the optimization of U.S. military
forces to combat the New Threat.
B. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS
Analysis of the new threat using the new planning paradigm indicates that a
reordering of the U.S. Navy's various missions is required. The capability to
project power ashore moves to the forefront, while the need to achieve sea control
over extensive reaches of ocean decreases in importance as the Soviet threat
continues to decline. While the size of the Navy can shrink as the New Threat
emerges, the capabilities of individual units must steadily be improved to
successfully combat it. In the New Threat environment, surface combatants and
submarines will be able tc perform many of the roles previously reserved for
aircraft carrier battle groups. A comparison of naval force structures under the old
and new planning paradigm has already been summarized in Table One, which is
reprinted below for convenience.
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TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF NAVAL FORCE STRUCTURE REQUIREMENTS UNDER
THE CONTAINMENT PARADIGM AND THE NEW PARADIGM
Containment Paradigm New Paradigm
LARGE NAVY MODERATELY SIZED NAVY
SEA CONTROL OVER LARGE
AREAS, SLOC PROTECTION
NECESSARY







HIGH ENDURANCE HIGH ENDURANCE
CONDUCT WORLDWIDE
SIMULTANEOUS OPS
RESPOND TO 2 OR 3 CRISES
SIMULTANEOUSLY






SHORT PERIODS. MORE LOW
TECH OPPOSITION THAN
FOR SOVIET THREAT.






(continued on next page)
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TABLE 1 (continued)
CONTINUOUS FORWARD DEPLOYMENT PERIODIC FORWARD
PRESENCE
INTELLIGENCE EFFORT FOCUSED INTELLIGENCE EFFORT
ON SOVIET UNION AND EAST BLOC WORLDWIDE IN SCOPE
FOREIGN BASES FOR STRIKE, COMMS, FOREIGN BASES FOR
INTELLIGENCE GATHERING; LARGE LOGISTICS;SMALL
NUMBER NUMBER
These new force structure requirements point to the need to develop a Navy
with the following characteristics:
• The size of the Navy should decline as the Soviet threat declines. This Navy
should be composed of a relatively larger number of amphibious and
auxiliary ships to enhance power projection capabilities and a relatively
smaller number of aircraft carriers, surface combatants and submarines.
• The number of aircraft carriers in the fleet should be based on a policy
decision regarding the number of crises to which the Navy is desired to
respond simultaneously. For example, a fleet of twelve carriers should enable
the Navy to send a carrier to each of three crises simultaneously and to
maintain this posture for sustained periods of time. Surface combatants and
submarines could be used without carrier support to respond to a number of
other relatively smaller scale crises. The Navy could bring more than three
carriers to bear on crises for short periods of time with a fleet of twelve
carriers, but sustained operations of this scale would erode equipment
condition and personnel morale and retention, conditions with longterm
deleterious effects. Additionally, the ability to substitute surface combatants
and submarines for large deck aircraft carriers in certain situations rules
against substituting a new class of "small deck" aircraft carrier for the large
deck ones.
• The Navy must maintain Research and Development (R&D) at high levels
(including R&D into various exotic technologies) to remain at the forefront of
high technology, a prerequisite for prevailing in crises against Third World
adversaries armed with high tech weaponry. This effort must include the
actual building and fielding of new systems aboard respective naval
platforms to ensure adequate operational testing over a variety of climatic
conditions.
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• The Navy must consciously preserve America's heavy industrial capability to
provide important naval systems. Such a requirement implies that the Navy
continue to field new ship, aircraft and submarine types with the latest high
technology applications, even though this means building smaller numbers of
each type of unit and incurring higher unit costs.
The new paradigm also augers change for the personnel organization of the
Navy. Intelligence gathering organizations should expand their scope to
encompass surveillance of emerging threat centers to a greater degree. Steps
already underway to formalize career paths of strategic planners should continue,
and similar steps should be taken to enhance the value derived from personnel
educated in Area Studies, International Organizations and Negotiations, and
Legislative Affairs.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY
The issues addressed above point to a number of areas where further study
would be of value in refining the application of the new paradigm to naval force
planning. Some of these areas of study are the proper purview of Operational
Analysts and Intelligence Officers rather than strategic planners. Additional
study is recommended in the following areas:
• As one way of shedding light on the actual capabilities of the Soviet armed
forces to wage sustained global warfare, strategic planners should
investigate the degree to which Soviet economic problems have degraded
expected Soviet naval performance. While the Soviet Navy remains large
and is modernizing, the degree of economic disruption occurring in the USSR
would seem to indicate that those platforms cannot be employed for any
length of time without suffering serious degradation in their performance
because of lack of fuel, weapons and spare parts. Additionally, planners
should attempt to quantize the degree to which the Soviet population would
resist, actively or passively, the initiation of a war against the West.
• By means of computer modeling, planners should compare the performance of
the present U.S. naval force structure with a hypothetical naval force
structure formulated by use of the new paradigm in various hypothetical
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crises as well as actual crises from the recent past to see how each force
performs.
• Operational analysts should look at the number of crises to which a U.S.
naval force designed by use of the new paradigm could respond. Both
sustained and short term responses should be analyzed, including the
feasibility of substituting different combinations of surface ships and
submarines for aircraft carriers. Analysts should consider both situations in
which surface ships or submarines are used from the beginning of the crisis as
well as those in which carriers are employed initially but are replaced by
surface ships or submarines after the enemy has expended or considerably
degraded his inventory of high tech weapons.
• A separate study should be conducted to refine the scenarios in which surface
ships or submarines could be substituted for aircraft carriers.
• The feasibility of combatant, amphibious and auxiliary vessels utilizing
Combined Nuclear and Gas Turbine (CONAG) and combined nuclear and
conventionally steam powered propulsion systems should be reviewed. The
endurance afforded to naval vessels by nuclear propulsion will have even
higher utility as the New Threat causes the endurance demanded of the U.S.
Navy to rise and the availability of foreign bases to decline.
• A downstream study should be performed to assess the effectiveness and
merit of implementing a more formalized career path for strategic planners.
• A study should be performed to determine the qualities that make some
Foreign Affairs Officers successful while others fail. The information from
such a study could be used in training Navy Area Specialists as well as in
assessing the value in formalizing their career paths.
1). EPILOGUE
To paraphrase Lord Salisbury, America has no eternal friends and no eternal
enemies -- America only has eternal interests. As the Soviet threat declines,
continued use of the old paradigm will incline planners and policy makers to
continue to focus on the USSR and design forces to counter that threat and fight
under conditions that threat implies will be necessary. Such an approach may
result in naval forces that are poorly configured to fight and win in other areas of
the world against adversaries fielding Western weapons. Continued use of the
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Containment Paradigm may unconsciously have planners and policy makers
ascribe Soviet involvement in situations where there is none in fact, and therefore
react improperly.
On the other hand, adoption of the new paradigm will provide a more
objective basis for assessing crises and for designing naval and all U.S. military
forces. It will not ignore the actions, capabilities and intentions of the USSR, but
will keep them in perspective. Most importantly, it will result in forces and
strategies capable of protecting America's national interests, including
preservation of the capability to increase the size of the armed forces when (not if)
such action becomes necessary in the future.
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